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Commercial Bribery: Choice and 




Searching for the most suitable money remedy for a simple 
commercial bribe promptly lands a lawyer, judge, professor, 
student, or researcher in a remedial smorgasbord. De-
emphasizing injunctions, commercial bribery offers a spectrum of 
monetary remedies.  
The plaintiff has two defendants, the briber and the bribee. 
He has two major remedies, damages and restitution. The 
overlapping policies consist of compensating the plaintiff, 
preventing the defendants’ unjust enrichment, deterring the 
defendants and others, and punishing the defendants. Courts 
implement these policies with compensatory damages, restitution, 
and punitive damages. A bribe can be returned as damages or 
restitution, a significant distinction. Punishment points the 
court’s remedial compass at punitive damages. The law 
distinguishes between legal restitution and equitable restitution. 
Equitable restitution distinguishes between constructive trust and 
accounting-disgorgement; if a defendant has other creditors, the 
distinction takes center stage. Recovery from the briber adds the 
possibility of duplication. The possibilities of confusion and excess 
lurk in the wings. 
Bribery is a private law-public law hybrid; commercial 
bribery is on the private law side. Commercial bribery plays a role 
in three recent Restatements; Employment, Restitution, and 
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Agency. Courts in the United States cite persuasive authority from 
other common-law jurisdictions to fill gaps in local positive law. 
Domestic courts may learn from others about alternative solutions 
to shared problems. Some differences, for example, in jury trial, 
statutes, punitive damages and equitable restitution, frustrate 
complete unification.  
Stating the courts’ choice and measurement alternatives 
proves to be a daunting task. In addition, this Article is generous 
with advice about the routes lawyers and courts should take. This 
Article adduces legal theory in an effort to clarify the better 
choices. Plaintiffs’ lawyers have a wide range of possibilities. The 
courts’ demanding duty is to align policies, remedies rules, and 
solutions. The results turn out to be challenging at best, often 
problematic. The risk of inaccuracy and over-correction is 
pervasive. The search has not found a substitute for human 
judgment. Principles of confinement, understanding of 
alternatives, and careful contextual analysis will improve courts’ 
decision making. 
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I. Introduction 
This Article will examine civil courts’ money remedies to deal 
with private commercial bribery through the lens of the following 
hypothetical.  
Sam Sailer “gives” Ben Beyer’s purchasing agent, Alice 
Aggie, a sound system worth $8,000. Sailer’s “gratuity” facilitates 
Aggie’s decision to buy Sailer’s speakers to sell in Beyer’s 
NoisiStan Stores. Beyer learns about Aggie’s new speakers and 
consults a lawyer.  
My Remedies course in the spring of 2014 spent two class 
sessions on commercial bribery.1 The students began the course 
thinking of Remedies law as having separate pigeonholes named 
contract and tort, law and equity, damages and restitution; 
overall, they were baffled during our commercial bribery 
sessions. My experience with commercial bribery in the 
classroom drew me to develop further the subject that David 
Mills and Robert Weisberg refer to as “a fascinatingly under-
explored area.”2  
                                                                                                     
 1. See DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE ROBERTS, REMEDIES 857–63 (8th ed. 
2011) (supplying the hypothetical for this article and providing a rough first 
draft for it). 
 2. David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in 
White-Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406 (2008). 
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A. Gift or Bribe? 
A bribe is a transfer that often takes the ostensible form of a 
gift. In property law, the elements of a gift are the donor’s intent 
to give plus a transfer to the donee; a gift does not require an 
exchange of consideration.3 But a bribe concealed as a gift 
involves the parties’ surreptitious exchange of consideration 
whereby the bribe recipient agrees to “earn” the transfer.4  
In this shadow world, we inquire whether Sailer and Aggie 
created a corrupt bargain. Was Sailer’s transfer to Aggie a gift 
that stemmed from his friendship and altruism? Or was it a bribe 
based on his self-interest? Was there a quid pro quo, Aggie’s 
promise or a wink and nod? Standing alone, the parties’ 
consideration may not be illegal on either side; but the addition 
of the bribe element is an illegal performance.5 
Some employment-related transfers to agents are not 
bribes.6 A “gift” to an employee that her employer knows about—
a tip, for example—is not a bribe.7 One rule of thumb is: “If you 
can eat it and drink it in a single sitting, it’s not a bribe.”8  
In the grey area between a bribe and a gift, many “gifts” are 
based less on the “donor’s” altruism than on his interest in 
                                                                                                     
 3. See WALTER B. RAUSCHENBUSH, BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.1 (3d 
ed. 1975) (“A gift may be defined as a voluntary transfer of his property by one 
to another without any consideration of compensation therefor.” (quoting Gray 
v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68, 72 (1873))). 
 4. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–
05 (1999) (“[F]or bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give 
or receive something of value in exchange for an . . . act.”). 
 5. See GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 8.5, 8.5 nn.6–7 (1978) 
[hereinafter PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION] (describing one form of illegal 
contract as where two parties agree to a transaction that, in and of itself, is 
illegal (citing Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 267 (1880))). 
 6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. b, illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 
1958). 
 7. See Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, 406 A.2d 474, 486, 491–92 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (stating that there is “no fraud perpetrated” where 
the employer is aware of the bonus, gift, or commission and consummates an 
agreement for business anyway). 
 8. Stephanie Francis Ward, Want to Be a Federal Judge by 35? 9th 
Circuit’s Alexander Kozinski Shares Some Tips, A.B.A. J. (July 20, 2015, 12:11 
PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/want_to_be_a_federal_judge_ by_ 
35_9th_circuits_alex_kozinski_shares_some_tip/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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obtaining the “donee’s” goodwill in one form or another.9 On the 
“donee’s” side, the human impulse to reciprocate may lead her to 
return the favor.10 A campaign contributor, for example, may 
have a disinterested policy goal. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that 
“spending large sums of money in connection with elections . . . 
does not give rise to . . . quid pro quo corruption.”11 In the grey 
area, a contributor may achieve recognition or access that blends 
into influence and reciprocity. Or the contributor may cross the 
bribery line by conditioning his payment directly on the 
politician’s specific vote on specific legislation.12 
“At what point do the ‘gifts’ become so clearly transactional, 
however, that the behavior they induce is no longer viewed as 
altruistic, but crass? That is the key question. The answer lies 
both in the nature of the gift and the nature of the relationship 
between the creator of the gift and its recipient.”13 In tax law, for 
example, an instrumental gift is income to the recipient, an 
affectionate gift is subject to the donor’s gift tax.14 “As the word is 
most commonly used today, [criminal] ‘bribery’ probably denotes 
an actual or contemplated exchange of something of value for 
favorable governmental action, not simply a unilateral act 
intended to make favorable governmental action more likely.”15 
Our hypothetical is not in the grey area. Aggie is the 
purchasing agent for Beyer. Sailer gave her a “gratuity.” She 
reciprocated. Suppose Beyer confronts Aggie with that “gift” and 
with her later purchase of Sailer’s speakers for NoisaStan 
inventory. She responds that Sailer is “just a dear friend.”  
                                                                                                     
 9. See generally Mary Finley Wolfenbarger, Motivations and Symbolism 
in Gift-Giving Behavior, 17 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 699 (1990) (discussing 
self-interest as an elemental part of gift-giving). 
 10. See id. 699–706 (discussing social norms in the context of gift-giving). 
 11. McCutchen v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014). 
 12. See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 621, 651, 688–90 (1987) (covering the 
topic of campaign contributions and bribery). 
 13.  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW & ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN 
REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 105 (2016). 
 14.  See United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1127 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that sisters charged with tax evasion on money for sexual “favors” 
provided by their lover which they had claimed as gifts were not guilty of willful 
tax evasion). 
 15. Albert Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of 
Bribery Make Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 472 (2015). 
374 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369 (2017) 
How might a court respond to a similar tale? An employee of 
the United States Department of Agriculture accepted two 
automobiles and a deep freeze as “gifts” from one De Angelis who 
participated in programs the department administered.16 Despite 
the employee’s claims that Mr. De Angelis was just a friend and 
“a kind and generous man,” the court entered judgment in favor 
of the Government.17 Explaining the difference between a bribe 
and a perishable effort to “express friendship and assure a warm 
welcome,” the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit observed that “if the jury agreed that a matured scheme 
existed, aimed at providing millions of dollars in which Harwood 
would share, no jury could rationally believe that this was merely 
to cultivate friendship.”18 
B. Civil and Criminal Remedies 
Civil remedies for commercial bribery function in the 
penumbra of related areas of law. First, in criminal law, a private 
commercial bribe may also be a crime. Criminal statutes in 
thirty-nine states forbid commercial bribery; public-sector bribery 
is criminal nationwide.19 The United States has no general 
                                                                                                     
 16. See United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 858–61 (E.D. Va. 1969) 
(providing no satisfactory reason why Mr. DeAngelis gave Mr. Drisko those 
“gifts”). 
 17. See id. at 860 (finding “that the deep freezer, the automobiles and the 
money [the defendant] received from Mr. DeAngelis were secret profits and 
gratuities”). 
 18. United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United 
States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 311–17 (1910) (reviewing the facts arising from 
the illicit collection of contractors’ excess profits by a government official in the 
amount of about $500,000). 
 19. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3–641.4 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:21-10 (West 1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00-08 (McKinney 1983); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (West 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-444 (2016); MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 224.8 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); Jeffery Boles, Examining the Lax 
Treatment of Commercial Bribery in the United States: A Prescription for 
Reform, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 119, 159 (2014) (“While all fifty states have 
criminalized public sector bribery, such is not the case for commercial bribery. 
Eleven states have yet to criminalize the offense of commercial bribery.”). The 
most important and informative book about bribery is Judge John Noonan’s 
wide-ranging Bribes (1987), which deals almost exclusively with criminal 
treatment of bribery. See generally NOONAN, supra note 12. 
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domestic federal criminal-bribery statute.20 But it has specific 
anti-bribery statutes, such as bribery of quiz show affiliates, for 
example.21  
Bribery of a government official is serious. A civil 
consequence of bribery with public-law consequences is that 
Article II, Section 4 of the United States Constitution specifically 
lists bribery as a ground for impeachment and removal from 
office.22 Criminal statutes that forbid and punish official bribery 
are universal.23 Bribery of a public official to facilitate a sale or a 
contract, although more serious than private bribery, is relevant 
to our subject. While this article was being written and in press, 
a defense contractor’s protracted and brazen bribery of Pacific 
Fleet officers including admirals was unraveling in guilty pleas.24 
Additionally, other criminal statutes come into play in the 
context of bribery. For example, former Vice-President Agnew 
was prosecuted for tax evasion on the kickbacks and bribes he 
received.25 Federal statutes related to bribery are the 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Boles, supra note 19, at 122 (“The U.S. Congress has not enacted a 
blanket criminal statute that outlaws the practice, although a patchwork of 
federal legislation has been used to prosecute commercial bribery.”); Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, The Law and Economics of Bribery and Extortion, 6 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 217, 226 (2010) (“Some legal systems criminalize 
private-to-private bribery, but in many jurisdictions such transactions are not 
against the law unless they involve another illegal offense, such as extortion or 
operation of an illegal business.”). 
 21. See 47 U.S.C. § 509(a)(2) (2012) (prohibiting the use of coercion or 
bribery to influence a person to intentionally answer questions wrong or refrain 
from answering on a quiz show). 
 22. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil 
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). 
 23. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.8 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b) (2012) (making illegal any payment or gift to a public official in order to 
corruptly influence that official to a specific official or otherwise illegal act). 
 24. See Craig Whitlock, Navy Repeatedly Dismissed Evidence that ‘Fat 
Leonard’ was Cheating the 7th Fleet, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/navy-repeatedly-dismissed-
evidence-that-fat-leonard-was-cheating-the-7th-fleet/2016/12/27/0afb2738-c5ab-
11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html?utm_term=.ddea1af112d8 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2017) (detailing the scope of the fraud) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 25. See JAMES PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 
1945–1971, at 776 (1996) (detailing Vice President Agnew’s prosecution for tax 
evasion). 
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“honest-services” statute that courts have interpreted to cover 
kickbacks and bribery,26 the False Claims Act,27 the 
Whistleblower Protection Act,28 the Federal Anti-Kickback Act,29 
wire fraud,30 the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, (RICO),31 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act.32  
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which makes it a crime 
for a United States company to bribe a government official in 
another country, is mostly enforced by SEC and DOJ 
settlements.33 In late 2016, a generic drug maker settled criminal 
                                                                                                     
 26. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010) (discussing 
case law demonstrating bribes and kickbacks to be at the “core [of] honest 
services fraud precedents” (citing United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 
1077 (1st Cir. 1997))); see also McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 
2368–69 (2016) (applying interpretive canon noscitur a sociis to find a narrow 
definition of official act); United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860–61 
(E.D. Va. 1969) (determining that the United States should be awarded 
remedies where an employee of the Department of Agriculture received “gifts” 
from businessmen in order to use his office to further the businessmen’s 
interests); United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(“[T]he authorities are unanimous that an officer or agent breaches his duty of 
loyalty to his corporation or principal by accepting bribes to compromise his 
principal’s interests.”); United States v. St. Pierre, 377 F. Supp. 1063, 1064–65 
(S.D. Fla. 1974) (stating that criminal prosecution does not bar recovery of civil 
remedies). See generally United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 2002), 
aff’d en banc, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing personal injury lawyers’ 
indirect kickbacks to insurance adjusters). 
 27. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2012) (laying out the False Claims Act as 
well as procedure for civil remedies under the Act.). 
 28. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2012) (prohibiting any employer from taking 
“personnel action,” measures against anyone who reports a suspected violation 
of law or public health and safety, including termination). 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012) (“[In federal health care programs] 
whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration 
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or 
covertly, in cash or in kind . . . shall be guilty of a felony.”). 
 30  See Andrea Gerlin, Deals on the Side: How a Penny Buyer Made Up to 
$1.5 Million of Vendors’ Kickbacks, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1995, at A1 (detailing 
how vendors paid $1.5 million to a single buyer over four years). 
 31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012) (authorizing civil remedies for RICO 
violations); see also Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston, 763 F.3d 723, 728 
(7th Cir. 2014) (discussing casino’s civil RICO action alleging that members of 
horse-racing industry bribed governor). 
 32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012) (addressing bribery of foreign government 
officials by U.S. citizens). 
 33. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks—U.S. 
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and civil charges for bribery of officials for $520 million.34 A New 
York Times story describes how Wal-Mart’s employees’ bribery in 
Mexico affects the “culture” of the company, its governance, its 
employees, and its stockholders.35  
Commentators have maintained that criminal statutes are 
needed because the private common and statutory law is “clearly 
inadequate.”36 However, private commercial bribery is rarely 
prosecuted as a crime.37 Publicity-conscious companies sweep 
bribery cases under the rug.38 An unscientific survey uncovered 
widespread ignorance of the criminal statutes.  
Most enforcement of commercial bribery is civil.39 A 
plaintiff’s civil remedies for commercial bribery are, as we will 
                                                                                                     
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Some Observations 
and Thoughts (Sept. 13, 2012), 2012 WL 4328247, at 3 (elaborating on the 
Department of Justice’s preferred method of using deferred prosecution 
agreements to settle with defendants in FCPA cases); see also John R. Cook, 
U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission Guide to 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcements, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 227 (2013) 
(“The guide comes at a time of greatly increased FCPA enforcement, much 
involving foreign companies, including nearly $3.2 billion in settlements . . . .”). 
 34.  Charles Toutant, Teva Agrees to Pay $520M Over Bribes to Foreign 
Officials, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.thelegal 
intelligencer.com/id=1202775429882/Teva-Agrees-to-Pay-520M-Over-Bribes-to-
Foreign-Officials (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (describing the settlement as the 
largest criminal fine on a pharmaceutical company for FCPA violations) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35. See Elizabeth A. Harris, After Bribery Scandal, High-Level Departures 
at Walmart, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/business/after-
walmart-bribery-scandals-a-pattern-of-quiet-departures.html (last visited Mar. 
6, 2017) (noting the company increased its compliance staff by 30% in two 
years) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36. Note, Commercial Bribery, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1928); see also 
Boles, supra note 19, at 120–21, 158 (highlighting the “rampant” nature of 
commercial bribery and the public benefits to statutory enforcement); Note, 
Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, 46 MINN. L. REV. 
599, 603–04 (1962) (discussing the inadequacy of civil remedies). 
 37. See Boles, supra note 19, at 165 (“At present, federal and state 
governments rarely prosecute commercial bribery, once called ‘the most under-
prosecuted crime in penal law.’” (quoting Bob Wacker, Inside a Case of 
Commercial Bribery: How a Kickback Scheme in Hawaii Led to LI Sting, 
NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 1988, at 1)). 
 38. See Gerlin, supra note 30 (featuring Jim G. Locklear, the poster boy 
bribe-taking purchasing agent). 
 39. See Note, Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal 
Legislation, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848, 853–55 (1960) (“The most salient feature of 
the cases in this area is that they are very few in number and most of those 
378 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369 (2017) 
see, formidable.40 A student Note writer observed that the severe 
civil remedies may deter people from reporting commercial 
bribery to criminal authorities; but the Note continued by 
stating, “it is questionable whether modification would encourage 
disclosure.”41 A business’s best defenses against bribery are its 
internal controls and practices.42 
Generally speaking, criminal law is “public” law that the 
government uses to punish the defendant’s misconduct.43 Civil 
law is “private” law for a private plaintiff to maintain and 
vindicate his rights, and to receive a remedy.44 The question of 
whether the state should deal with a person’s misconduct as 
either a crime or a civil matter is that “an offence should be 
treated as a civil matter . . . if society wishes to trade off the 
benefits to the perpetrator against the costs.”45  
One observation is that “tort law prices, while criminal law 
punishes.”46 In commercial bribery, that observation is 
incomplete. Criminal and civil law are related as a Venn diagram 
of overlapping circles. The civil court can wield punitive damages 
to punish the defendant, but the civil defendant’s criminal 
consequences may affect the amount of punitive damages.47 If the 
                                                                                                     
which are to be found are civil rather than criminal.”). 
 40. See Note, Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, 
supra note 36, at 603–04 (stating that civil remedies include losses suffered in 
operating a business prior to the rescission of purchase, the cost of time lost by 
the principal, expenses incurred, non-taxable litigation expenses, attorney fees, 
the value of the amount actually bribed, and the ability to dismiss the agent). 
 41. Note, Bribery in Commercial Relations, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1251 
(1932). 
 42. See Boles, supra note 19, at 168–72 (discussing the implementation of 
proactive compliance measures in the private sector). 
 43.  See generally Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public 
Law-Private Law Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (1986). 
 44. See id. at 271 (including subjects that define “the enforceable duties 
that all individuals owe to one another,” such as contract, torts, property, and 
trusts and estates). 
 45. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 221 n.4. 
 46. John Coffee, Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”: Reflections on the 
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 
194 (1991). 
 47. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361–62 (Me. 1985) (deciding to 
affirm a judgment but vacate an award for punitive damages based on 
otherwise criminal activity because the defendant’s recklessness did not amount 
to malice). 
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civil court grants the plaintiff an injunction, the defendant’s 
subsequent breach may lead to criminal contempt.48 Many types 
of misconduct are both civil and criminal—for example, 
assault-battery crimes against a person are also torts.49 The civil 
law defines property, thus leading to the crime of theft and the 
tort of conversion.50 As part of a criminal prosecution, the 
prosecuting officials may secure compensation, mislabeled as 
“restitution,” for the victim.51 The bribee’s imprisonment may 
prevent her from earning any income. Criminal fines and civil-
asset forfeitures may take the defendant’s assets.52 Ray Nagin, 
the former mayor of New Orleans, was convicted of taking bribes 
from businessmen in exchange for city work; in addition to his 
criminal sentence, the judge entered a forfeiture order for 
$501,000.53 
What do the criminal commercial bribery statutes and rare 
prosecutions imply for the civil commercial-bribery process?54 
The government’s criminal prosecution does not bar the private 
                                                                                                     
 48. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441–42 (1911) 
(discussing the role of criminal contempt in vindicating the authority of the 
court). 
 49. See Barnett, supra note 34, at 268 (discussing the philosophy behind 
the tort/crime distinction). 
 50. See id. (explaining that theft “offends public standards of ‘good’ 
conduct” but is “wrongful in that it deprives a particular individual of 
something that belonged to her”).  
 51. See United States v. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719–20 (2014) (using 
“proximate cause” analysis in tort to limit an award of restitution in a criminal 
case). 
 52. See generally Phillip Londen, Comment, Arizona's Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Scheme: Distorted Justice, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475 (2015) (providing 
summary, analysis, and criticism of federal and state forfeiture); James Simon, 
Note, Virginia's Civil Asset Forfeiture System: Valuable Tool or Vehicle for 
Abuse?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
 53. See United States v. Nagin, 810 F.3d 348, 352–54 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(upholding personal money judgment against defendant); see also Gabrielle 
Levy, Ray Nagin, Former New Orleans Mayor, Must Pay Back $500K, UNITED 
PRESS INT’L (May 28, 2014 4:17 PM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/ 
US/2014/05/28/Ray-Nagin-former-New-Orleans-mayor-must-pay-back-500K/925 
1401306822/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (detailing Mayor Ragin’s payment order 
for his involvement in over 20 counts of fraud) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 54  See generally Graham Virgo, We Do This in the Criminal Law and That 
in the Law of Tort: A New Fusion Debate, in TORT LAW, CHALLENGING 
ORTHODOXY (Stephen Pitel, Jason Neyres & Erica Chamberlin eds., 2013). 
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plaintiff’s recovery of civil remedies.55 However, using a threat to 
prosecute another for a crime—for example, Sailer’s threat to 
Aggie’s mother—to secure a civil advantage or settlement, is 
improper duress.56 The defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination—if the civil defendant claims it—may 
impede the plaintiff’s civil discovery and trial testimony; because 
of the defendant’s privilege, the court will usually stay the civil 
process until the criminal process plays out.57 Although delay is 
usually the defendant’s friend, delay to wait out the criminal 
process may benefit the civil plaintiff because the defendant’s 
criminal conviction or guilty plea will establish issue preclusion 
or estoppel in the civil case.58 The burdens of proof differ. In 
criminal law proceedings require culpability beyond a reasonable 
doubt while civil proceedings only require a preponderance of the 
evidence. Accordingly, a defendant may be acquitted of the crime, 
but found liable to the civil plaintiff.59 
                                                                                                     
 55. See United States v. St. Pierre, 377 F. Supp. 1063, 1064–65 (S.D. Fla. 
1974) (“‘[A]lternate tax and criminal remedies . . . do not bar the [plaintiff] from 
recovering the secret profits and gratuities thus received [in] civil action.’” 
(quoting United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860 (E.D. Va. 1969))). 
 56. See Bank of Tucson v. Adrian, 245 F. Supp. 595, 598–99 (D. Minn. 
1964) (treating the threat of jail for a third party as arising to the level of 
duress entitling the threatened parties to recovery); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 14 illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011) (illustrating how threatening a third party with legal action constitutes 
“impermissible coercion as a matter of law”). 
 57. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 97 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (“A stay can protect a civil defendant from facing the difficult choice 
between being prejudiced in the civil litigation, if the defendant asserts his or 
her Fifth Amendment privilege, or from being prejudiced in the criminal 
litigation if he or she waives that privilege in the civil litigation.”). 
 58. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“Issue 
preclusion . . . bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually 
litigated and resolved in a valid court’ . . . even if the issue recurs in the context 
of a different claim.” (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748–49 
(2001))). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 85 (AM. LAW INST. 
1982). 
 59. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 
U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (“The acquittal of the criminal charges may have only 
represented ‘an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all 
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.’ As to the issues raised, it does not 
constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden 
applicable in civil proceedings.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Ashley v. 
Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25 (HL) [para. 17–18] (appeal 
taken from [2006] EWCA Civ 1085) (UK) (holding that different standards of 
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This Article will next examine an employer’s civil remedies 
against his bribed agent. Then it will move to his remedies 
against the bribing seller. After discussing the employer’s 
remedies against the bribee and the briber separately, the Article 
will examine the defendants together.  
II. Civil Remedies: The Employer Sues the Employee 
The plaintiff’s private substantive theories largely stem from 
the common law of agency, fiduciary duties, employment law, 
contract, and tort, but they also include statutory responses.60 
Courts’ remedies include compensatory damages, legal and 
equitable restitution, and punitive damages along with their 
close relative, statutory multiplied damages.61 The Article’s 
technical doctrinal analysis will focus on courts’ decisions and the 
policies of compensation, reversing unjust enrichment, 
deterrence, and punishment. Coordinating the principal’s 
smorgasbord of remedies to avoid excess and duplication is subtle 
and difficult in light of the policy goals.  
Courts in the United States rely on, and cite to, United 
Kingdom decisions.62 The law of commercial bribery in other 
common law jurisdictions, although similar to the United States’, 
differs in interesting ways depending not only on local statutes, 
but also in the differing weight courts assign to policies interests 
such as third-party interests, the importance of predictability, 
the initial decision-maker’s discretion, and the need for rules 
rather than standards.63 
                                                                                                     
proof apply in civil and criminal cases dealing with assault). 
60. See Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the 
Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1263 (2015) (discussing fiduciary 
relationship in the context of insider trading prohibition); see, e.g., United 
States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806 (D.N.J. 2012) (assessing an allegation 
of bribery by looking to the general definition of bribery, state law precedent, 
the common law, and state statutes). 
 61. See infra notes 434–439 and accompanying text (describing the 
difficulties in combining compensatory damages and restitution when the 
plaintiff attempts to recover from both the giver and receiver of a bribe). 
 62. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 307–08 (1910) (referring to 
English decisions and scholarship). 
 63. See generally MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 26–
37 (1988); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
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“Bribery is an evil practice,” wrote the Privy Council, “which 
threatens the foundations of any civilized society.”64 Sailer’s bribe 
raised the price or lowered the quality of goods to Aggie’s 
employer Beyer, whose customers, in turn, pay too much. As a 
result, rival sellers, Sailer, and the briber’s competitors, lose the 
ability to compete.65 The easiest part of our inquiry is the answer 
that popular and judicial intuitions combine with market 
economic theory to condemn a bribe as a wrong.  
Human cussedness has not changed much. “[T]he principles 
governing the paying or giving of bribes and secret commissions 
to fiduciaries have been settled since at least the late 19th 
century,” wrote Paul Finn, J., for the full Federal court in 
Australia in Grimaldi v. Chameleon Mining.66  
Courts’ common law reasoning proceeds through policy 
justification to rule, and through rule to result and remedy.67 The 
courts’ difficulties in aligning policy, rule, and result and their 
fuzziness in characterization, choice, and measurement are 
notable throughout this study. As a consequence, an untidy 
result orientation may occur because courts and juries appear to 
be avid in reversing commercial bribery and suppressing it in the 
future. Working in the grey areas and fringes to identify excess 
zeal is the difficult aspect of this inquiry.  
                                                                                                     
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 118–26 
(1991). 
 64. Attorney General for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal 
taken from NZCA) (UK); see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 218 
(“[C]orruption is associated with lower levels of investment, productivity, and 
growth and . . . discourages both capital inflows and foreign direct 
investment . . . . Overall, corruption reduces the perceived legitimacy of 
democratic governments.”). But see Mills & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1412–15 
(noting that bribery is not always anticompetitive). 
 65. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act: 
The Case for Per Se Illegality, 42 MIAMI L. REV. 365, 390–91 (1987) (showing the 
anticompetitive effects of commercial bribery, including the raising of prices 
generally). 
 66. N.L. [No 2] (2012) 200 FCR 296, 348 (Austl.). The law of bribery is 
related enough to Judge Finn’s subject, the law of business self and double-
dealing to qualify the latter as precedent for bribery. See generally Reid, 1 AC 
324 (PC) at 330. 
 67. See generally EISENBERG, supra note 63, at 26–37; SCHAUER, supra note 
63, at 118–26. 
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A. Breach of Duty? 
What branch of civil misconduct has Aggie committed? 
Commercial bribery law is rooted in contract, tort, 
employment-law, and agency-fiduciary principles.68 In general, 
an employer’s contract remedies—compensatory damages—are 
more conservative than tort or agency-fiduciary remedies—often, 
restitution. In addition to lower recovery, the defendant will 
prefer a contract characterization because neither the plaintiff’s 
recovery for breach of fiduciary duty nor his recovery for most 
intentional torts will be discharged in her bankruptcy.69  
Scholarly ferment surrounds the fiduciary’s legal-theory and 
doctrinal home. A leading private-law scholar, Professor Lionel 
Smith, rejects a contract base for commercial bribery; the 
solution to a fiduciary’s breach does not “derive from a breach of 
a promissory obligation.”70 Fiduciary law, Smith writes, has no 
deterrent function; not instrumental, fiduciary law is based in 
the normative structure.71 For Smith, fiduciary duties are 
“unified” and loyalty is a requirement, not a duty.72 Courts’ 
solutions to fiduciary disputes are rules of primary attribution, 
not secondary remedies rules.73 
On the other hand, Professor Adit Bagchi moves his analysis 
of the related duty of loyalty from fiduciary status to contract. 74 
                                                                                                     
 68. See United States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806 (D.N.J. 2012) 
(detailing the various sources and origins of the law of bribery). 
 69. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(4), (6) (2012) (recognizing that a discharge for 
“fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity” or for “willful and 
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity” will not occur). 
 70. Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of 
Judgment on Behalf of Another, 130 L.Q. REV. 608, 613–14 (2014) [hereinafter 
Smith, Fiduciary Relationships]. 
 71. See id. at 626 (“I disagree with Lord Millett when he says that 
fiduciary law has a deterrent function or is driven by public policy; in my view, 
it reflects the normative structure of the fiduciary relationship.”). 
 72. See id. at 633 (“In private law, fiduciary relationships are characterised 
by three elements: the requirement of loyalty, the no-conflict rules, and the 
no-profit rule. They form a unified system for ensuring the loyal exercise of 
judgement on behalf of another.”). 
 73. See id. at 628 (arguing that the right of the beneficiary to recover profit 
is born of the fiduciary duty to render the profit, not from a secondary duty to 
repay after being found liable for wrongdoing). 
 74. See Adit Bagchi, Exit, Choice and Employee Loyalty, in CONTRACT 
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 17–19 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 
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An employee’s duty of loyalty, he maintains, is contractual; it 
implements the employee’s contractual duty of good faith; it is 
not founded on the employee’s fiduciary status.75 
In general, the conditions for creation of a fiduciary duty are 
satisfied when a principal delegates power to an agent; the agent 
substituting for the principal exercises power to decide; and the 
delegation and decisions create a risk of abuse and misconduct 
that neither the principal nor the market can prevent.76 
Fiduciary duty is not “monolithic.”77 “Fiduciary” is not a 
unified concept, but it varies from one application to another. A 
corporate officer is also an agent. An officer’s fiduciary duties are 
more demanding than a director’s. An errant officer ought to 
“face a greater risk of personal liability for misconduct.”78 
Suppose, for example, a mother’s will creates a special-needs 
trust naming her intellectually disabled daughter as beneficiary 
and her son as trustee. Contrast these relationships with our 
problem of fiduciary law as a subset of agency law—for example, 
a business owner and a purchasing agent where the owner can 
monitor, direct, and discharge the agent.  
Between the employer and employee, commercial bribery is 
part of the familiar law-and-economics doctrine of agency cost.79 
An agent’s interest conflicts with her employer’s.80 In a 
principal-agent pair, the principal-employer is the boss who 
                                                                                                     
forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2759401 (arguing that employers 
wield too much power over employees without a formal contract). 
 75.  See id. at 2 (“As a mandatory duty applied to the (generally) less 
informed and less powerful party to contract, it should be narrowly construed 
where job duties and terms of exist are unspecified in an employment contract 
ex ante.”). 
 76. See Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F.3d 1201, 1211 (10th Cir. 
2007) (“The fiduciary duty exists because of the ‘peculiar’ trust between the 
employee-agent and his employer-principal.” (citing Johnson v. Brewer & 
Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002))). 
 77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 78. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers 
Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1603 (2005). 
 79. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
 80. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 637 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff, Agency Costs Theory] 
(“The losses to the parties that stem from such a misalignment of interests are 
called agency costs.”). 
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delegates discretionary decision-making authority to his 
subordinate, the agent-employee.81 Tensions arise. The employer 
cannot hire, train, and monitor employees to assure that his 
interest will always be implemented, and he has limited ability to 
control employees with rewards and penalties.82 An employee 
with specialized knowledge may maximize return and minimize 
effort.83 The conflicts of interest are inevitable, as anyone who 
has been either an employer or an employee knows.84 The gap 
between the employer’s aspiration and the employee’s reality is 
the agency cost.85  
When an agent accepts a bribe, she is no longer working 
loyally on behalf of her principal’s interest, but rather she is 
advancing the briber’s and her own self-interest. A commercial 
bribe has a more serious agency cost than an employee’s 
goldbricking or personal internet surfing to shop on the office 
computer.86 When discovered, it will usually trigger the 
employee’s discharge, and it often catapults the parties into 
court.87 As a Minnesota court stated, “[f]idelity in the agent is 
what is aimed at, and, as a means of securing it, the law will not 
permit him to place himself in a position in which he may be 
tempted by his own private interests to disregard those of his 
principal.”88  
                                                                                                     
 81. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976). 
 82. See id. at 308 (adding that “the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal”). 
 83. Id.  
 84. See id. (noting that it is “generally impossible” for the principal to 
ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions, which maximize the 
principal’s utility). 
 85. See generally Sitkoff, Agency Costs Theory, supra note 80 (highlighting 
the agency cost emerging from the phenomenon of misaligned interests). 
 86. See Gevurtz, supra note 65, at 390–91 (showing the harsh effects, in 
particular anticompetitive effects, of commercial bribery). 
 87. See Note, Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, 
supra note 36, at 603–04 (highlighting normal procedure in the course of civil 
litigation for remedying commercial bribery). 
 88. Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802–03 (Minn. 1952); see also 
United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910) (discussing the importance of 
establishing rules that prevent agents from hiding self-serving practices from 
their principal); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1961) (“The 
law exacts a faithful single-minded devotion to the interests of the master.”); 
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The Employment Restatement defines the employee’s duty of 
loyalty, fiduciary duty, as one of “trust and confidence.”89 An 
employee with a fiduciary duty based on trust and confidence 
may be liable for disgorgement and forfeiture.90 In contrast, a 
“rank and file” employee with only an implied fiduciary duty is 
liable for more limited contract damages.91 
Even though lawyers and courts may consult the newly 
minted Restatement of Employment Law,92 the “national” 
employment law is often neither structured nor uniform, a 
situation that creates opportunities and choices for lawyers’ 
advocacy and courts’ characterization. Within employment law, 
the law on employer remedies against an employee is 
underdeveloped, because most former employees lack money to 
pay a judgment and the employer is usually satisfied with 
firing.93  
“[F]iduciary law is vague and open-ended around the 
edges.”94 In the grey areas, a court can select the desired 
remedy, and then work backward to characterize the 
appropriate substantive base.95 As the Connecticut court 
                                                                                                     
Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, 406 A.2d 474, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1979) (“The evil of commercial bribery is the invasion of the principal's right to 
undivided loyalty from his agent which results from secret payments to the 
agent.”); Laseter v. Sistrunk, 168 So. 2d 652, 656 (Miss. 1964) (“[The agent] is 
duty bound not to act adversely to the interest of his employer by serving or 
acquiring any private interest of his own in antagonism or opposition thereto.”). 
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
90. See id. § 9.09(d) (“If an employee personally profits from a breach of 
fiduciary duty, the employer can recover those profits from the employee.”). 
91. Id. § 9.09(a)–(c). 
92. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW (AM. LAW INST. 
2015). 
93. See Charles Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1391, 1401 n.58, 1410 n.109, 1419 n.162 (2015) (referencing instances 
where employers were satisfied with termination, where employees were viewed 
as judgment proof, or where employers were actually able to recover damages). 
94. Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 273 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 
2014). 
 95. See Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 (Conn. 1955) (discussing the 
trend to stay away from outright definition of the term “fiduciary” in order to 
leave “the bars down” to new situations); see also George P. Roach, 
Compensation Forfeiture: Stacking Remedies Against Disloyal Agents and 
Employees, 47 ST. MARY'S L.J. 249, 317–18 (noting disagreement on the precise 
requirements of the duty of loyalty for rank-and-file workers). 
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explained, “equity has carefully refrained from defining a 
fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as 
to exclude new situations. It has left the bars down for 
situations in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one 
side and a resulting superiority and influence on the other.”96 “A 
fiduciary,” a lawyer quipped, “is what the judge calls your client 
right before finding against him.” 
Sailer has bribed Aggie to buy his speakers. As a 
purchasing agent, Aggie enjoys her employer’s trust and 
confidence. An agent like Aggie owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty 
to her principal. A fiduciary must be other-regarding and favor 
her principal’s interests above hers and others’.97 Aggie has 
breached either her freestanding fiduciary duty or an implied 
fiduciary term of loyalty in her contract with her employer.  
She also owes him a tort fiduciary duty of loyalty;98 her 
self-dealing breaches that duty.99 Her secret profit breached two 
duties: her contract and her fiduciary duty.100 The 
contract-fiduciary-tort distinction is our first area of choice or 
characterization.  
                                                                                                     
 96. Id. 
 97. See generally Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 70. 
 98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(characterizing breach of fiduciary duty as a tort). 
 99. See supra notes 87–90 (providing for an employee’s duty of “trust and 
confidence,” and providing damages for employee disloyalty, as well as damages 
for disgorgement in the even the employee directly profits from the disloyalty); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 8.01 cmt. d, 8.02 cmt. e (2006) (dealing with 
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty). See generally HOWARD A. SPECTER & 
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION § 9.06 
(1989). When the ALI’s members approved the proposed final draft of the third 
Restatement of Employment Law at the May 2014 meeting, § 8.01's fiduciary 
duty of loyalty was amended. The duty is only owed by an employee who 
occupies a position of trust and confidence, but depending on the circumstances, 
an employee may owe an implied duty of loyalty. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 100. See generally DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 699 (2d ed. 
2011) [hereinafter DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS]. See also United States v. 
Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1961) (criticizing the district court for viewing 
the issue too narrowly by classifying it as merely a breach of contract); Jaclyn, 
Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 491 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1979). (stating that New Jersey courts have treated such situations as both tort 
actions and trust actions). 
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The Restatements of Agency and Employment provide for an 
injunction to forbid the briber from continuing his misconduct.101 
Although some employers may seek an injunction, Beyer—who 
has fired Aggie—will not patronize Sailer again. He is not 
interested in an injunction. We turn below to Beyer’s money 
remedies. 
The employer may choose between compensatory damages 
and restitution.102 This Article considers compensatory damages, 
restitution, and punitive damages. Within compensatory 
damages, the employer may choose between contract and tort.103 
A contract plaintiff may usually not recover punitive damages, 
unless the breach includes an independent tort.104 The employer’s 
tort damages will usually be larger because recoveries for 
emotional distress are available for a tort,105 and, if the 
defendant’s misconduct surmounts the jurisdiction’s threshold, a 
tort plaintiff may recover punitive damages.106 
Restitution takes two forms, legal and equitable.107 
Restitution may be augmented with punitive damages.108 
                                                                                                     
101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.08(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
2015) (providing for an injunction); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d 
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. d 
(AM. LAW INST. 1958) (same). If Aggie violates a noncompetition covenant, Beyer 
may seek an injunction prohibiting future violations. See Presto-X-Company v. 
Ewing, 442 N.W.2d 85, 89–91 (Iowa 1989) (remanding on grounds that the 
lower court should have issued an injunction where a non-compete agreement 
was involved); Robert S. Weiss & Assocs. v. Weiderlight, 546 A.2d 216, 226 
(Conn. 1988). 
 102. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1048 (2011) (contrasting compensatory damages with 
disgorgement). 
 103. See Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (Cal. 1996) 
(“Recovery . . . may be limited by the rule against double recovery of tort and 
contract compensatory damages.” (citing Tavaglione v. Billings, 4 Cal. 4th 1150, 
1159 (Cal. 1993))). 
 104. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (Md. 1977) (“[T]he 
rule has developed that punitive damages may never be recovered in pure 
breach of contract suits . . . .”). 
 105.  DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 382. 
 106. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 25 (2001) (describing a case 
where the appellee sought punitive damages for “embarrassment, humiliation, 
and emotional distress”). 
 107. See generally RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 491–92. 
 108. See Ward v. Taggert, 336 P.2d 534, 538 (Cal. 1959) (“Courts award 
exemplary damages to discourage oppression, fraud, or malice by punishing the 
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 389 
Equitable restitution, in turn, takes two forms, constructive 
trust109 and accounting.110 We will observe a shifting focus on 
compensation, reversing unjust enrichment, deterrence, and 
punishment below as courts examine the employer’s money 
remedies that flow from commercial bribery.111  
We will inquire whether the employer’s remedies are well 
adjusted to the employee’s blameworthiness or are potentially too 
harsh, too draconian. 
B. Salary Forfeiture 
For an employer’s remedies, we begin with salary forfeiture. 
The court may order a bribed employee to forfeit her 
compensation, subject to statutes on wage payment and to 
                                                                                                     
wrongdoer. Such damages are appropriate in cases . . . where restitution would 
have little or no deterrent effect, for wrongdoers would run no risk of liability to 
their victims beyond that of returning what they wrongfully obtained.” (internal 
citation omitted)). The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment states: 
[B]ecause disgorgement, at least in theory, imposes no net loss on the 
defendant, there are situations in which a court may conclude that 
the threat of liability to disgorge profits will not adequately deter the 
misconduct . . . . A court that reaches this conclusion will sometimes 
supplement the defendant’s liability in restitution with an award of 
exemplary damages. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. k (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011). 
109.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 110.  See id. § 51 cmt. a (“Restitution measured by the defendant’s wrongful 
gain is frequently called ‘disgorgement.’ Other cases refer to an ‘accounting’ or 
an ‘accounting for profits.’”). 
 111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e, reporter’s note e 
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (articulating the available remedies “to a principal when 
an agent receives a secret commission from a third party,” “a third party’s 
liability to the principal,” and “when a defendant is a director or senior 
executive of a corporation”); ANDREW BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 615–21 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter BURROWS, REMEDIES] 
(discussing remedies for bribes and secret commissions); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF 
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 10.6 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter 
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES] (discussing liabilities for a bribing seller’s liability to 
the buyer and to competitors for commercial bribery and associated harms). See 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 
cmt. d, illus. 17–18; id. § 44 cmt. b, illus. 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
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feasible apportionment.112 “Mr. Kelly’s claims,” a court wrote, “for 
back salary and expense reimbursement are dismissed as not 
recoverable because of his disloyalty to his employer during the 
period for which he is making those claims.”113 The bribe negates 
an element of an agent’s contract cause of action for wages, and it 
serves as the employer’s affirmative defense.114 Forfeiture may 
also be an employer’s freestanding equitable restitution remedy 
interposed either as a claim or a counterclaim.115 Forfeiture may 
comprise the largest portion of the employer’s remedy.116  
                                                                                                     
 112. See Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d 862, 874–75 (N.J. 2015) (ordering 
former executive to disgorge salary during periods of disloyalty even though 
employer had no compensatory damages). See generally PALMER, THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 14.9; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 9.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d(2) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent's breach of fiduciary duty is a basis on which the 
agent may be required to forfeit commissions and other compensation. The 
availability of forfeiture is not limited to its use as a defense to an agent's claim 
for compensation.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 456 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 1958) (“If an agent is paid a salary apportioned to periods of time, or 
compensation apportioned to the completion of specified items of work, he is 
entitled to receive the stipulated compensation for periods or items properly 
completed before his renunciation or discharge.”); id. § 469 cmt. d (“The fact 
that [an agent] has been disloyal or insubordinate in one transaction does not 
disentitle him to indemnity on account of other transactions.”); Commercial 
Bribery, supra note 36, at 800 (“The breach of duty would privilege the principal 
in discharging the agent, without incurring any liability for the compensation 
that he had agreed to pay . . . .” (citing Dennison v. Aldirch, 114 Mo. App. 700 
(1905))); Commercial Bribery: The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, supra note 
36, at 603–04 (“[T]he principal may dismiss the disloyal agent without incurring 
any liability for breach of an employment contract . . . . However, the agent’s 
disloyalty does not allow the principal to withhold compensation for prior or 
subsequent faithful service unless such payment includes some compensation 
for willfully disloyal service.”). See generally Control of Nongovernmental 
Corruption by Criminal Legislation, supra note 39, at 855. 
 113. MDO Dev. Corp. v. Kelly, 726 F. Supp. 79, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also 
Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734 S.W.2d 322, 
323–26 (Tenn. 1987). 
 114. See Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation, 
supra note 39, at 855 (“Another frequent situation finds the agent or employee 
suing the seller on their contract to recover the compensation promised for his 
services. Such a contract is of course not recognized if the seller can prove that 
it was in violation of the criminal statutes.” (citing Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 
268, 271 (1948))). 
 115.  See generally Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d 862, 872 (N.J. 2015). For 
more detailed discussion of forfeiture, see Roach, supra note 95, at 305–07, 311.  
 116.  See Roach, supra note 95 at 292, app. (comparing recoveries in ten 
cases). 
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If Beyer sues her, Aggie’s counterclaim to recover her back 
salary may fail. Indeed Beyer may recover her salary from the 
disloyal period. The reason for saying “may” twice in the 
preceding sentences is that the Employment Restatement, 
without resolving the issue definitively, seems to present the 
defendant’s wage forfeiture as an alternative to the plaintiff’s 
compensatory damages: first, it hints that forfeiture may 
constitute “double recovery”—that is, apparently duplicating 
damages117—and, second, that forfeiture will occur when the 
employer lacks a “practicable method for making a reasonable 
calculation of the harm”—that is, when damages cannot be 
calculated.118  
The Employment Restatement’s comments articulate several 
ways to calculate the amount the agent forfeits based on time, 
task, willfulness, and the employer’s damages.119 Its comments 
retreat from stern moralistic “forfeiture for disloyalty” positions 
and apparently adopt a flexible multi-factor approach.120 
Although the Employment Restatement does not focus on 
commercial bribery, we commend a commercial-bribery court to 
adopt its flexible, multi-factor approach to calculate Aggie’s wage 
forfeiture. 
                                                                                                     
 117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(c) (AM. LAW INST. 
2015) (stating that an employer can deny compensation owed and obtain the 
return of any compensation paid except where the employer would obtain from 
double recovery). 
 118. 
[A]n employer may deny any compensation owed, and obtain the 
return of any compensation paid, to an employee who breaches the 
employee’s duty of loyalty owed the employer where . . . the nature of 
the employee’s dishonesty is such that there is no practicable method 
for making a reasonable calculation of the harm caused the employer 
by the employee’s disloyal services. 
Id. 
 119. See id. cmt. c (describing the possible ways to determine the amount an 
employee forfeits based on the extent to which an employee’s compensation can 
be allocated to time periods or tasks, willful breach of the duty of loyalty, and 
harm caused by the employee’s breach); see also Roach, supra note 95, at 332–
38. 
 120. See id. (“This Section adopts a position similar to those jurisdictions 
that have rejected a flat-out ‘forfeiture for disloyalty’ approach. [Instead], the 
employer can deny compensation to the disloyal employee to the extent the 
economic harm caused by the employee’s disloyal services exceeds any benefit 
provided by the employee.”). 
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Professor Charles Sullivan would circumscribe the 
employer’s forfeiture remedy even more.121 He would limit it to 
higher-level employees because board control is either weak or 
absent.122 He would narrow it there to include only the 
employee’s subjective willful misconduct.123 Lower-level 
employees do not owe their employers a duty of loyalty for 
fiduciary status and a forfeiture remedy, but they are liable for 
contract damages only.124 He would eliminate wage forfeiture for 
an employee’s theft, limiting the employer to tort and criminal 
remedies.125 He took no position on kickbacks.126  
C. Compensatory Damages 
The policy basis of compensatory damages begins with 
compensation, to put the plaintiff where he would have been 
economically without the defendant’s breach.127 Another policy 
justification for damages is deterrence, to reduce the incentive 
to cause harm,128 the harm here being to receive or give a 
bribe.129 The Employment Restatement allows the employer to 
recover money damages for “past and reasonably certain future 
                                                                                                     
 121. See generally Charles Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant: 
Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. 
REV. 777, 814–18 (2011).  
 122. Id. at 819–22 (“Although in theory even higher-level employees are 
subject to the control of the employer, typically a corporation's board of 
directors, in practice the exercise of such control is likely to be weak or even 
nonexistent, a reality that has generated numerous proposals for reform of 
corporate governance.”).  
 123. Id. at 822–26 (arguing that narrowing the remedy to willful misconduct 
“would at least provide courts with an escape hatch from forfeiture where the 
breach was not egregious, and . . . such an escape hatch would be used more 
frequently when the employer suffered no harm”).  
 124. Id. at 819. 
 125. Id. at 817. 
 126. See generally id. at 817–25. 
 127. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 1.1 (“The damages 
remedy is a money remedy aimed at making good the plaintiff’s losses.”). 
 128. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 14. 
 129. See generally Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N. L. (No 2) [2012] 200 
FCR 296, 349, 421 (Austl.); PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION 339 (1989) [hereinafter BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION]. 
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economic loss and noneconomic loss.”130 Aggie’s employer may 
also recover special damages.131 For example, he may recover 
proved lost business profits.132 The Employment Restatement 
doesn’t develop the employer’s damages remedy but refers the 
reader back to its earlier section on the employee’s damages 
when the employer breaches.133 More specific statements of the 
employer’s compensatory damages comprise pecuniary damages 
for his lost business profit and good will as well as nonpecuniary 
damages for his emotional distress. 
The Minnesota court’s decision in Tarnowski v. Resop134 
illustrates an employer’s compensatory damages for a 
commercial bribery. The parties entered into a fiduciary 
relationship in which the agent agreed to inspect coin-operated 
music machines on behalf of the principal, who wished to 
purchase the machines if they met certain specifications.135 The 
agent not only lied about the location and profitability of the 
machines, but he also accepted bribes from the machine seller.136 
Even though the principal rescinded his contract with the seller, 
the court found the agent liable for the amount of the bribe plus 
all damages that could reasonably be foreseen because of his 
tortious breach of fiduciary duty.137 Compensation for injury to 
the principal’s business and attorney’s fees were among the 
principal’s foreseeable damages.138 
                                                                                                     
 130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
2015). 
 131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 132. See Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1952) (allowing for 
recovery of lost profits); Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble 
Distrib. Co., 734 S.W.2d 322, 323–26 (Tenn. 1987) (same); Banks v. Mario 
Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 696 (Va. 2007) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (same).  
 133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2015). 
 134. 51 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1952). 
 135. Id. at 802. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 803–05. 
 138. Id. at 803. 
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Her employer may recover the bribe from the bribed 
employee.139 We will turn below to the ambiguity about whether 
recovery of the bribe is restitution or compensatory damages. 
D. Restitution 
Restitution’s policy base is twofold: to reverse or prevent the 
defendant’s unjust enrichment and to deter the defendant and 
others from engaging in similar misconduct.140 Recovery of 
damages to compensate the plaintiff for loss is not involved in 
restitution. 
In general, a faithless fiduciary must disgorge her unjust 
gains.141 A court will speak in the language of fiduciary 
responsibility: a fiduciary who breaches a trust relationship and 
benefits as a result may not retain the benefit. Aggie’s return of 
any compensation she received during her disloyal period142 is 
                                                                                                     
 139. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 43(1) illus. 17, 18 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006). See also United States v. Killough, 
848 F.2d 1523, 1532 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that an employer may recover a 
bribe); United States v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 171 (D.S.C. 1979) (same); 
Tarnowski, 51 N.W.2d at 803 (same); Risvold v. Gustafson, 296 N.W. 411, 413 
(Minn. 1941) (same); Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 492 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (same); Commercial Bribery, supra note 36, at 
800 (discussing bribery of agents under the common law); Commercial Bribery: 
The Need for Legislation in Minnesota, supra note 36, at 603 (noting an 
employer may recover his actual damages, excluding the bribe, only once); 
Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal Legislation, supra note 39, 
at 855–56 (detailing who is entitled to the bribe money, against whom, and 
under what circumstances). 
 140. See generally Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N.L. (No 2) [2012] 200 
FCR 296, 349, 421 (Austl.); BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 129, at 339. 
 141. See generally United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp. 
2d 73, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2008); Daniel v. Falcon Interest Realty Corp., 190 S.W.3d 
177, 186–87 (Tex. App. 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 9.09(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2011); SPECTER & FINKIN, supra 
note 99, § 9.08; PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, §§ 2.11, 8.5. 
 142. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(c) (AM. LAW INST. 
2015) (allowing employer’s to “recover any compensation paid” as a result of the 
breach of “the employee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer”); United 
States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910) (arguing that “justice will not 
tolerate, under any circumstances, that a[n] [agent] shall retain any profit or 
advantage which he may realize through the acquirement of an interest in 
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restitution.143 The agent’s employer may recover his employee’s 
personal profits from her breach of her fiduciary duty of 
loyalty.144 
Restitution is divided into two categories, giving-back 
restitution and giving-up restitution.145 In giving-back 
restitution, the plaintiff’s minus is the defendant’s plus—for 
example, an incorrect bank deposit where the depositor’s gain is 
the bank’s loss.146 The employer’s recapture of an embezzler’s 
bezzle or a breaching employee’s compensation—forfeiture—is 
giving-back restitution that is not otherwise involved in remedies 
for commercial bribery.147 
In giving-up restitution—the focus here—the plaintiff has no 
minus or cannot prove one, and the defendant’s benefit is from 
elsewhere. Giving-up restitution is usually based on defendant’s 
tort or other wrong.148 Giving-up restitution can be either the 
legal restitution common count of money had and received149 or 
equitable restitution in the form of either a constructive trust or 
an accounting.150 The pattern in restitution for commercial 
bribery is giving-up restitution; the bribe moved from the briber 
to the agent. This leaves the agent with a plus without any 
minus subtracted from the principal. 
                                                                                                     
conflict with his fidelity as an agent”); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44 
(5th Cir. 1961) (noting that a master “is entitled to all the fruits of the servant’s 
dereliction” (citations omitted)); Laseter v. Sistrunk, 168 So. 2d 652, 656 (Miss. 
1964) (“[A]n agent . . . cannot, without the latter's consent, retain profits or 
earnings received in the course of performance of the employer's business or in 
an undertaking which constitutes a breach of duty to the employer.”). 
143. See PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 8.5 n.9 (citing 
cases in support). 
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 1(e)(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“A liability in unjust enrichment (restitution) is 
enforced by restitution's characteristic remedies, some (but not all) of which 
involve a literal restitution or giving back.”). 
146. See id. § 1(e)(1) (“Restitution restores something to someone, or 
restores someone to a previous position.”). 
147. See id. (“[Restitution] may do the former by restoring the very property 
that the claimant gave up, or by granting substitute property rights.”).  
148. See generally id. §§ 3, 39, 40–49, 51, 55. 
149. See generally United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 317 (1910). 
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 51, 
55 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
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Although the Restatement of Restitution’s basic section one 
says that the defendant’s enrichment must be “at the expense of” 
the plaintiff, the comment explains that  
[W]hile the paradigm case of unjust enrichment is one in 
which the benefit on one side of the transaction corresponds to 
an observable loss on the other, the consecrated formula “at 
the expense of another” can also mean “in violation of the 
other’s legally protected rights,” without the need to show that 
the claimant has suffered a loss.151 
Restitution is based on the defendant’s gain, not on plaintiff’s 
loss. A restitution plaintiff may recover the defendant’s gain even 
though that gain exceeds the plaintiff’s loss measured by 
compensatory damages.152 Compensation drops out because the 
restitution plaintiff may lack any pecuniary loss for 
compensatory damages.153 The commercial bribery plaintiff may 
recover the bribe as restitution, even if he has neither pecuniary 
loss nor compensatory damages.154 The policies advanced by the 
buyer’s restitution are preventing the defendants’ unjust 
enrichment and deterrence restitution policies, not 
compensatory-damages policies.155 
                                                                                                     
 151. Id. § 1 cmt. a; see also Caroline Needham, Recovering the Profits of 
Bribery, 95 L.Q. REV. 536, 537–38 (1979). 
 152.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (discussing circumstances where recovery may 
exceed compensatory damages). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 307 (1910) (allowing 
employer to recover employee’s illicit gains); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 
40, 44–45 (5th Cir. 1961) (reversing summary judgment on the grounds that 
evidence of an employee acting in his own self-interest at the expense of his 
employer provided sufficient facts upon which to state a claim of relief); Cty. of 
Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (“[W]hen a fiduciary, 
who has acted for his beneficiary or principal, receives a gift, or bonus or 
commission from a party with whom he has transacted business, that benefit 
may be recovered from him by the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship.”); 
Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802–03 (Minn. 1952) (“If an agent has 
received a benefit as a result of violating his duty of loyalty, the principal is 
entitled to recover from him what he has so received, its value, or its proceeds, 
and also the amount of damage thereby caused . . . .” (internal citations 
omitted)). See generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11.  
 155. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT §§ 43 illus. 17–19, reporter’s note; 44 illus. 9, reporter’s note b (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2006). 
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In United States v. Carter,156 for example, a captain of the 
United States army with discretion to hire contractors fell into a 
bribery scheme with river and harbor contractors.157 The work 
was completed satisfactorily.158 Although the United States was 
unable to prove specific pecuniary injury or harm from his 
bribery scheme, it sought an accounting of all of Carter’s illicit 
profits.159 The Court found that “[i]t would be a dangerous 
precedent to lay down as law that unless some affirmative fraud 
or loss can be shown, the agent may hold on to any secret benefit 
he may be able to make out of his agency.”160 The Court noted 
that agents are capable of hiding their deception and “[i]t [is] not 
easy to show in some instances that the work ha[s] suffered by 
the substitution of one material for another,” making it difficult 
for the employer to prove specific harm.161 As such, “[i]t is 
immaterial if that appears whether the complainant was able to 
show any specific abuse of discretion, or whether it was able to 
show that it had suffered any actual loss by fraud or 
otherwise.”162 The Court did not base the principal’s recovery on 
a finding of its specific harm, but rather on the agent’s abuse of 
trust that warranted an accounting of his illicit gains.163 
In addition to the agent’s breaches of fiduciary and 
confidential relationships that we are examining,164 a restitution 
plaintiff either without compensatory damages or with 
compensatory damages that are less than the defendant’s gain 
may recover the defendant’s gain.165 There are several well-
known examples of this brand of restitution in torts: trespass,166 
                                                                                                     
 156. 217 U.S. 286 (1910). 
 157. Id. at 297–98. 
 158. Id. at 298–300. 
 159. Id. at 317. 
 160. Id. at 305. 
 161. Id. at 302.  
 162. Id. at 305–06. 
 163. Id. at 303–04. 
 164. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 43 illus. 14, 15 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 165. See generally id. § 55, cmts. a, i; BURROWS, REMEDIES, supra note 111, 
at 616; PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11. 
 166. See Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1028–29 (Ky. 1936) 
(discussing a case where two adjoining landowners’ properties sat over a cave, 
and one landowner profited from charging visitors and the other sued to collect 
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overuse of an easement,167 and conversion.168 Statutes allow 
restitution that exceeds plaintiff’s damages for a trademark 
infringer on non-competing goods or services,169 a copyright 
infringer,170 and a trade-secrets infringer.171 In equity, a plaintiff 
may recover restitution that exceeds damages when, for example, 
the trustee of an express trust “borrows” trust money and profits 
from a forbidden investment,172 a trustee buys at the auction,173 
or a business fiduciary improperly takes advantage of a business 
opportunity.174 A final example of a plaintiff’s restitution 
                                                                                                     
the profits reaped from trespass into his portion of the cave). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011). 
 167. See Raven Red Ash v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 238 (Va. 1946) (“To limit 
plaintiff to the recovery of nominal damages for the repeated trespasses will 
enable defendant, as a trespasser, to obtain a more favorable position than a 
party contracting for the same right. Natural justice plainly requires the law to 
imply a promise to pay a fair value of the benefits received.”). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 illus. 8 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 168. See Olwell v. Nye & Nisson, 173 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash. 1946) 
(measuring defendant’s gain from use of egg washing machine rather than 
plaintiff’s loss for damages). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 illus. 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 169. See Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 
123–25 (9th Cir. 1968) (finding it appropriate to make trademark infringement 
“unprofitable,” via an accounting of profits, to deter future infringement). See 
generally 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
 170. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012); Three Boys Music Corp. v. 
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 487 (9th Cir. 2000); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 402 (1940); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 illus. 7–9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 171. See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1985); RESTATEMENT OF (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 1995). 
 172. See Slay v. Burnett Tr., 187 S.W.2d 377, 389–90 (Tex. 1945) (finding 
payments collected by trustees recoverable). 
 173. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (“Since he did pursue it 
and profits resulted the law made him accountable to the trust estate for all the 
profits obtained by him and those who were associated with him in the matter, 
although the estate may not have been injured thereby.”); Smith v. Credico 
Indus. Loan Co., 362 S.E.2d 735, 737 (Va. 1987) (“[W]e hold that a co-trustee 
under a deed of trust cannot purchase property on behalf of herself or another 
at a foreclosure sale, even where that sale is conducted by another trustee, and 
even where the trustee who makes the purchase was not an active participant 
in conducting the sale.”). 
 174. See generally Sanford v. Keech (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223; RESTATEMENT 
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recovery that exceeds compensatory damages is insider 
trading.175  
The court may describe Beyer’s recovery of the amount of 
the bribe as restitution. If she keeps the speakers, Aggie will be 
benefitted or enriched. Her benefit from her breach of duty is an 
unjust one, for she secured it through a breach of contract and a 
tort. Restitution for her wrong seems straightforward.176  
Suppose that Aggie’s bribe caused no detriment to her 
principal because she purchased speakers that Beyer wanted 
from Sailer at a competitive price. Nevertheless, when an 
agent-employee accepts a bribe, she deprives her principal of 
her disinterested advice. Her conflict of interest and her breach 
of her duty of loyalty are obvious.177 Since the agent should not 
                                                                                                     
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 illus. 14, 15 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011). 
 175. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (“It is well 
established . . . that a person who acquires special knowledge or information by 
virtue of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to 
exploit that knowledge or information for his own personal benefit but must 
account to his principal for any profits derived therefrom.”). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 illus. 9 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
176. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
177. See Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 802 (Minn. 1952) (“It matters 
not that the principal has suffered no damage or even that the transaction has 
been profitable to him”); Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 
492 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (“An agent is presumed to be acting with 
absolute devotion to his principal at all times.”); City of New York v. Liberman, 
660 N.Y.S.2d 872, 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“It is a matter of grave public 
concern that there be absolute honesty in the procuring of a public contract.” 
(internal quotations omitted)). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMPLOYMENT 
LAW § 9.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY §§ 8.01 cmt. d, 8.02 cmt. e, illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); SPECTER & 
FINKIN, supra note 99, § 9.08; United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305–06 
(1910); United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. 
King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 171 (D.S.C. 1979). 
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retain the tainted benefit, no one else has a valid claim for it.178 
Beyer may recover the bribe, which is more than he lost.179 
Describing the bribe as unjust enrichment, Beyer may 
recover restitution from Aggie. Beyer’s recovery of $8,000, the 
amount of her unjust gain, from disloyal-employee Aggie seems 
relatively straightforward.180 
E. Damages and Legal Restitution 
A court may also characterize Beyer’s recovery of Aggie’s 
bribe as compensatory damages. The agent may have altered the 
course of the bribe money as follows: Aggie diverted a “benefit,” 
the bribe, that might have otherwise gone to Beyer. Sailer’s bribe 
represents what might have become Sailer’s discount or reduced 
price to Beyer.181 The court may state the employer’s recovery of 
the bribe as compensatory damages because his payment to the 
seller included “an overpayment in the amount of the 
commission.”182  
In a complex English dispute about whether an 
owner-principal could recover bribes that contractors had paid to 
the owner’s agent, the chancellor wrote that “the price [the owner 
paid the contractors] was actually increased by the amount of the 
                                                                                                     
 178. See generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11. 
For more examples see United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 307 (1910); United 
States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40, 44–45 (5th Cir. 1961); Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 
N.W.2d 801, 802–03 (Minn. 1952); Cty of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 544 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
 179. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that excess recovery is 
possible when “[i]n a two-party restitution contest . . . if the defendant is a 
conscious wrongdoer or a defaulting fiduciary”); Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, 
supra note 59, at 628–31, n.83, n.91. 
 180. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §10.6 n.2 (“The employer 
is thus entitled to recover the amount of the bribe from the employee.”). We set 
aside the question of whether the court should measure the employer’s recovery 
by wholesale rather than retail.  
 181. Borough of Salford v. Lever, [1891] 1 Q.B. 168 (C.A. 1890). 
 182. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11 n.22; see also 
Needham, supra note 151, at 538–39 (discussing the presumption that the real 
price of a good includes the bribe). See generally City of New York v. Liberman, 
660 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Reading v. Attorney Gen., [1951] 
A.C. 507 (HL) (Eng.). 
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bribe” that the contractors had paid to the faithless agent.183 
“The purchase money is loaded by the amount of the bribe.”184  
In City of New York v. Liberman,185 the City recovered the 
amount of the bribe even though the agent had returned it. The 
court articulated the result as “presumed” compensatory 
damages: it “presumed” injury because the bribe was included in 
the price.186 By another way of articulating damages as the 
result, “institutional” harm resulted even though the employer 
had no pecuniary loss.187  
Using the bribe to measure the employer’s damages is 
imprecise. A maximizing briber would expect to make more than 
the amount of the bribe: 
Where bribes are accepted by a trustee, servant, agent or 
other fiduciary, loss and damage are caused to the 
beneficiaries, master or principal whose interests have been 
betrayed. The amount of loss or damages resulting from the 
acceptance of a bribe may or may not be quantifiable. In the 
present case the amount of harm caused to the administration 
of justice in Hong Kong by the [corrupt prosecuting attorney] 
in return for bribes cannot be quantified.188 
A court may dispense with the amount of the bribe to 
measure damages and adopt an even more spacious 
measurement rule. One court distinguished between kickback 
and bribery schemes, and said that the damages measurement 
calculations are not necessarily identical. In United States v. 
Killough,189 two Alabama state officials who were in charge of 
administering a housing program received kickbacks from 
                                                                                                     
 183. Daraydan Holdings Ltd. v. Solland Int’l Ltd., [2004] EWHC (Ch.) 662, 
[para. 87]. 
 184. Donemar v. Molloy, 169 N.E. 610, 611 (N.Y. 1930). 
 185. 660 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 186. Id. at 43–48. 
 187. See I.M. Jackman, Restitution for Wrongs, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 302, 312–
14 (1989) (“The rationale for disgorging the fiduciary’s benefit might then not lie 
in protecting the beneficiaries from personal loss, but in preserving the integrity 
of the fiduciary relationship.”). 
 188. Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal taken 
from NZCA) (UK). See generally Mills & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1376, 1406; 
Bribery in Commercial Relations, supra note 41. 
 189. 848 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1988). 
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contractors in exchange for granting them contracts.190 The 
contractors inflated their prices to cover the amount of the 
kickback.191 The United States sued under the False Claims Act 
and moved for summary judgment for the amount of the 
kickbacks.192 The defendants argued that the government had 
“no actual damages” because none of the losing contractors’ bids 
were lower than theirs.193 The Court of Appeals responded with a 
spacious theory of injury and measurement: “When an official 
acting on behalf of the government receives money to which he is 
not entitled for the purpose of inducing that official to act in a 
certain manner, the government has been damaged to the extent 
that such corruption causes a diminution of the public’s 
confidence in the government, as well as by any excess money it 
paid and the administration costs of prosecuting the case.”194 
The Court of Appeals rejected the amount the contractors 
paid the officials as the measure of damages.195 The court said 
that kickbacks and bribes are two different legal violations; it 
stated that “[a]lthough a bribe and a kickback are both corrupt 
payments to a party to induce a desired reaction, they cannot be 
treated interchangeably for the method of computing 
damages.”196 The presumption of recovering the amount of a 
bribe did not apply to a kickback scheme. Instead, the court 
found that “[c]ase law indicates the measure of damages is 
generally determined to be the difference between what the 
government actually paid on the fraudulent claim and what it 
would have paid had there been fair, open and competitive 
bidding.”197 The amount of the bribes, although neither a floor 
nor a conclusive measure, was “circumstantial evidence.”198 
The amount of the bribe is more of a default rule than a 
measure of pecuniary damages.199 “Many damages recoveries,” 
                                                                                                     
 190. Id. at 1526. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 1532. 
 195. Id. at 1528. 
 196. Id. at 1532. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. 
 199. See John P. Woods, Civil Forfeiture as a Remedy for Corruption in 
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Dobbs wrote, “are built more on a legal convention than on a 
precise measurement and this seems to be one of them. But the 
amount of the bribe is clearly a good measure for recovery if no 
other is to be had and indeed might be better than most 
conventional measures.”200 
The Court of Appeals’ circumlocutions and imprecision 
illustrate Dobbs’s point above that the amount of the bribe, 
although imprecise, is better than alternative measures.201 
Another way to deal with a plaintiff who proves a cause of action 
but no damages is to award him nominal damages. However, 
courts seem to deal with damages measurement problems in 
commercial bribery by defaulting to award the bribe.202  
Because restitution does measure the bribe recipient’s unjust 
enrichment (or part of it), it is more analytically sound to identify 
the plaintiff’s recovery of the amount of the bribe from the bribee 
as restitution rather than compensatory damages. Beyer’s 
recovery of the bribe from Aggie even if he lost nothing identifies 
his remedy as restitution because the court measures restitution 
by the defendant’s gain or unjust enrichment, not to compensate 
the plaintiff’s loss.203 
An English court said that recovering the amount of the 
bribe was either legal restitution, money had and received, or 
damages.204 Up to this point, it doesn’t matter whether Beyer’s 
recovers $8,000 from Aggie as compensatory damages or legal 
restitution. Like a successful compensatory damages plaintiff, a 
successful legal restitution plaintiff receives a money judgment 
                                                                                                     
Public and Private Contracting in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 931, 960 n.209 
(2011–2012) (reviewing cases arguing if bribe amount reflected the true 
economic damage then bribers would bid lower and not risk prosecution). 
200. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6. 
201. Id. 
202. See id. (“[T]he amount of the bribe is clearly a good measure for 
recovery if no other is to be had and indeed might be better than most 
conventional measures.”). 
203. See BURROWS, REMEDIES, supra note 111, at 616 (“The fact that the 
[plaintiff] had not lost anything was irrelevant: the measure of relief, as in all 
bribe cases, was therefore indisputably restitutionary.”). 
204. See Hovenden & Sons v. Millhoff, (1900) 83 LT 41 (CA) at 43 (Eng.) 
(finding that the recovery of a bribe has been interpreted differently, but “it 
makes little difference in the case which view is the right one . . . the same 
amount is recoverable whether the action is on an indebitatus count or in 
damages”). For further discussion, see Roach, supra note 95, at 312. 
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that ranks equally with the defendant’s other similar creditors.205 
However, there are differences. 
In some circumstances, restitution may be more beneficial to 
the plaintiff than compensatory damages.206 The statute of 
limitations may differ between a shorter period to sue for a tort 
than for breach of contract or restitution.207 The time bar for 
equitable restitution will usually be laches instead of the statute 
of limitations.208 Tort or breach of contract damages and legal 
restitution for money had and received will be tried to a jury in 
the United States and lead to a personal money judgment.209 For 
restitution, it is not necessary that the agent diverted a benefit 
that would have gone to her principal.210 An agent’s principal 
may recover a bribe from the agent even though it was never 
intended for the principal and couldn’t be a lost price discount.211 
In a notable English case, the House of Lords granted the 
                                                                                                     
205. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 60 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); Emily Sherwin, Unjust Enrichment and 
Creditors, 27 REV. LITIG. 141, 143 (2007). 
 206. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 4.1(1) (explaining the 
relation between restitution and damages, and in which situations one may be 
preferred). See generally Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944 
(8th Cir. 1999). 
 207. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, 4.1(1) (“For example, if 
the statute of limitations has run on damages claims but not on claims for 
restitution, the plaintiff will assert unjust enrichment and claim restitution to 
take advantage of the statute.”). 
 208. See id. § 2.4(4) (noting that tradition holds that some statutes of 
limitation do not apply to equitable claims”). 
 209. See First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Ark. 
2005) (finding that the circuit court erred in submitting a count to the jury 
because one of the remedies sought was an equitable one not based in contract). 
See generally Eric J. Hamilton, Note, Federalism and the State Civil Jury 
Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 864 (2013). 
 210. See Savage v. Mayer, 203 P.2d 9, 10 (Cal. 1949) (“All benefits and 
advantages acquired by the agent as an outgrowth of the agency . . . are deemed 
to have been acquired for the benefit of the principal, and the principal is 
entitled to recover such benefits . . . .”). See generally Risvold v. Gustafson, 296 
N.W. 411, 412–13 (Minn. 1941). 
 211. See United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(explaining that a principal may recover the amount of bribes paid to an agent, 
not to compensate the principal for funds that were intended for him, but to 
deter agents from taking bribes or similar actions); see also PALMER, THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11 (“When a fiduciary profits through breach of a 
fiduciary obligation, he will be accountable to his principal without regard to 
whether or not the profit is at the expense of the principal.”). 
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government restitution from Reading, a soldier, who, in an 
occupied country, had accepted bribes to accompany smugglers’ 
trucks through checkpoints.212 The United Kingdom’s 
government would not have solicited or accepted the money 
Reading received from the smugglers. But the government, 
having seized the bribes, was allowed to retain them to prevent 
his unjust enrichment. 
F. Equitable Restitution 
Restitution for a commercial bribe takes two forms: First, 
legal restitution, for money had and received, which was 
discussed above.213  
Second, discussed here, is equitable restitution for either a 
constructive trust or an accounting-disgorgement.214 This subtle 
subject requires quite a bit of ink because of tracing, jury trial, 
and the difference between a money judgment and a personal 
order. 
1. Constructive Trust 
A constructive trust, which we introduce first, differs from an 
accounting, which follows. Courts have decided that agents hold 
bribes in constructive trust for their principals.215 Summarizing 
                                                                                                     
 212. See Reading v. Attorney Gen., [1951] AC 507 (HL) (Eng.) (“[A]ny official 
position, whether marked by a uniform or not, which enables the holder to earn 
money by its use gives his master a right to receive the money so earned even 
though it was earned by a criminal act.”). 
 213. See generally supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text. 
 214. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §§ 4.3(2), 4.3(5) 
(examining the equitable doctrines of constructive trusts and accounting). See 
generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11. 
 215. See United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding that 
the Government was entitled to impress a constructive trust on monies received 
by defendant in breach of his fiduciary duty as United States Congressman); 
Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 821 F. Supp. 292, 295 n.3, 
298 n.6 (D.N.J. 1993) (explaining that “an agent is presumed to act on behalf of 
the principal, and therefore any bribes collected by the agent are held in trust 
for the principal's benefit”); United States v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.S.C. 
1979) (determining that a consular official breached her fiduciary duty to the 
government by accepting bribes, and that the government was thus entitled to a 
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the features and effects of tracing and personal orders in a 
constructive trust will aid understanding of the differences 
between the constructive trust and accounting-disgorgement.  
Tracing is a constructive trust’s most important feature. The 
plaintiff identifies the constructive trust asset or res as “his 
property” and follows or “traces” it.216 The Restatement explains 
that “the effect of constructive trust is to vindicate [the plaintiff’s] 
claim to equitable ownership. If the claimant cannot show an 
equitable entitlement to specific property in the hands of the 
defendant, the underlying basis of the remedy is lost.”217  
The judge enforces a constructive trust with a personal order 
to the defendant to execute the trust, to convey the trust asset or 
res to the plaintiff.218 In contrast to the money judgment a 
successful legal-restitution plaintiff receives, a prevailing 
constructive trust plaintiff’s remedy is the court’s potentially 
coercive personal order that requires the defendant to transfer 
the asset to him.219  
First, tracing and the court’s in personam order will be 
crucial where the trust property or res is in another 
jurisdiction.220 For example, a bribed prosecuting attorney moved 
                                                                                                     
constructive trust on the property purchased with the bribery money); Cent. Ill. 
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Schell, 238 Ill. App. 560, 565 (1925) (“[T]he moment [the 
appellant] received any part or portion of appellee's money, he became a trustee 
ex maleficio, and subject to the jurisdiction of a court of equity. In such case, 
equity will impress a constructive trust upon the money in his hands.”); Jaclyn, 
Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 491 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1979) (stating that courts have adopted a rule imposing a constructive trust on 
payments received by an agent acting who is acting in a way that is a breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
 216. See Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating 
Restitution with Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 973, 992 (2011) [hereinafter Rendleman, Measurement of 
Restitution] (providing examples of tracing). 
 217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 
cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 218. See Pioneer Real Estate, Inc. v. Larese, 762 P.2d 720, 724 (Colo. App. 
1988) (“[B]y imposing constructive trust, court awards successful plaintiff 
personal order requiring defendant to transfer specific property to plaintiff.”). 
 219. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 55 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (stating that the court may direct the conditions on 
which the constructive trustee must surrender the constructive trust property 
to the claimant). See generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, 
§ 1.3. 
 220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
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the bribe from Hong Kong to New Zealand, where he bought 
property.221 Although the Hong Kong authorities sued him in 
New Zealand, a court in either jurisdiction with in personam 
power over him would have traced the bribes in Hong Kong into 
the New Zealand realty and held that he was a constructive 
trustee.222  
Second, a constructive trust plaintiff may trace his asset to 
third parties.223 Suppose Aggie gives an $8,000 money bribe to 
her daughter, Anjie. Anjie buys a racehorse named Devil His Due 
with the bribe money. Devil His Due finishes second in a 
handicap and earns a $16,000 purse. Beyer asks whether the 
court will find that Anjie, is a constructive trustee of the money, 
and later the horse, and whether the court will trace the bribe 
money into the horse, and from the horse into the purse, and 
impose a constructive trust against Aggie’s equitable or beneficial 
property interest in the purse? “If so,” a court wrote, “a 
constructive trust may be deemed imposed upon such funds, 
which trust would accordingly follow the ‘beneficial interest’ of 
ownership in the true asset.”224  
Third, under the court’s constructive trust, the plaintiff has 
an ownership right in the traced trust res.225 Suppose Aggie 
invested $6,000 of Beyer’s bribe money in a Studebaker 
automobile that is exempt from her other creditors’ claims.226 If 
                                                                                                     
§ 55 (AM. LAW INST. 2011)). 
 221. Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal taken 
from NZCA) (UK). 
 222. See generally RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 284–85. 
 223. See LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It is 
universally understood that ‘where a constructive trust has invested 
[wrongfully acquired] funds or has purchased other property [with wrongfully 
acquired funds], the [party for whose benefit a constructive trust has been 
imposed] can follow it wherever it can be traced.’” (citing Trustees of Clients’ 
Sec. Fund v. Yucht, 578 A.2d 900, 909 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989))); see also 
Fed. Republic of Brazil v. Durant Int’l Corp., [2015] UKPC 35, [2016] AC 297 
(appeal taken from the Court of Appeal of Jersey) (backwards tracing of bribery 
proceeds).  
 224. Id. 
 225. See generally GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND 
ESTATES § 471 (3d ed. Supp. 2016).  
 226. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26(8) (West) (providing that a debtor is entitled 
to hold motor vehicles valuing under $6000 exempt from creditor process). 
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Sailer can trace the bribe into the Studebaker, he can realize on 
it.227 
Fourth, suppose Aggie invested the $8,000 bribe in a stock 
that doubled in value. As foreshadowed by examples of the 
houses in New Zealand and the horserace purse above, a 
plaintiff’s constructive trust will capture the trust res’s gain in 
value or appreciation for the plaintiff.228  
Fifth, the plaintiff’s equitable ownership interest in the asset 
enables the plaintiff to realize on the asset and to outrank the 
defendant’s unsecured creditors in it.229 Suppose that Aggie owes 
$40,000 to another creditor, Crayon, but has only one asset, a 
$10,000 bribe. If the court declares Aggie a constructive trustee 
for Beyer, then Beyer will recover in full, while Crayon will 
recover nothing. 230 On the other hand, if Beyer recovers a money 
judgment for compensatory damages, an accounting, or legal 
restitution, money had and received variety, then, in a 
bankruptcy or other distribution, Beyer and Crayon share the 
$10,000 asset pro rata, proportional to the amount of their 
respective debts, 20% and 80%, $2,000 and $8,000 respectively.231  
                                                                                                     
 227. See Maki v. Chong, 75 P.3d 376, 379–80 (Nev. 2003) (providing that the 
exemption “homestead” protection does not apply to assets obtained with 
fraudulently acquired funds); Cox v. Waudby, 433 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa 1988) 
(“As a general proposition, a party in whose favor a constructive trust has been 
established may trace the property to where it is held and may reach whatever 
has been obtained through the use of it, including profits or income generated 
through its use.”). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 55 cmt. d, 58 cmt. g, 58 reporter’s note g (AM. LAW INST. 
2011); PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.15(a). 
 228.  See generally Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 
(appeal taken from NZCA) (UK); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(2) illus. 18 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e, illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 229. See Reid, 1 AC at 324 (describing the level of priority among creditors); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. d (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (stating the uses of a constructive trust as a means to priority). 
For additional examples, see United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 308 (1910); 
ITT Cmty. Dev. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1360–62 (5th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. King, 469 F. Supp. 167, 170–71 (D.S.C. 1979). 
 230. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 231. See Sherwin, supra note 205, at 143 (explaining that a constructive 
trust has priority over unsecured creditors, and that a plaintiff without a 
constructive trust would not have a higher priority). 
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Tracing that favors a constructive trust plaintiff over the 
defendant’s other creditors has been controversial because, 
unlike the defendant, the defendant’s other creditors are not 
wrongdoers.232 The Restatement of Restitution gives the judge 
discretion to subordinate a constructive-trust plaintiff’s recovery 
to the defendant’s innocent unsecured creditors.233 
An old-fashioned court might think that a commercial 
bribery plaintiff’s money judgment for legal restitution, money 
had and received, is the plaintiff’s adequate remedy at law.234 A 
modern court’s analysis would be more likely to be more 
functional and to focus on whether the plaintiff needs a feature of 
the constructive trust like tracing.235 Discussing the “erosion” of 
the inadequacy test when a plaintiff who could recover legal 
restitution seeks an equitable remedy, the late Professor Palmer 
observed that “remedial law can be applied both more easily and 
more sensibly when courts are able to give the relief called for by 
the facts.”236  
                                                                                                     
 232. See PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 4.10(a) 
(providing an overview of how some courts have or have not justified tracing); 
James Rogers, Indeterminacy and the Law of Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1377, 1399–1405 (2011) (exploring whether or not it is valid to give 
preference to the claim of a creditor who can trace over the claims of creditors 
who cannot trace); Peter Watts, Bribes and Constructive Trusts, 110 L.Q. REV. 
178, 179 (1994) (“[T]o give a proprietary remedy to a person who may have 
suffered no loss and who in any event would have other recourse, will, according 
to principle, operate to the prejudice of a person who, quite innocent of the 
source of the asset, lends money on an equitable security . . . . ”); Dale Oesterle, 
Restitution and Reform, 79 MICH. L. REV. 336, 359 (1980) (book review) (arguing 
that tracing should not be allowed outside the context of a fiduciary 
relationship). 
 233. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§§ 55 illus. 3, 61 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“The relative advantages of specific 
restitution make it virtually certain that [plaintiff’s] remedy will instead be a 
decree that [defendant] holds [the property] in constructive trust for 
[plaintiff].”). 
 234. See Waters v. Boyden, 176 N.E. 535, 566 (Mass. 1931) (“In such 
circumstances the plaintiffs have a complete remedy at law and the bill should 
not be retained merely because the obligation of the defendant is equitable as 
well as legal.”). 
 235. See Cty. of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) 
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s adequate remedy at law 
precluded a constructive trust). 
 236. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 1.6. See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011). 
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2. Accounting-Disgorgement 
An accounting is our second form of equitable restitution. An 
accounting is restitution for the defendant’s wrong.237 The 
Restatement of Restitution combines accounting with 
disgorgement; it requires defendant’s intentional misconduct, 
which includes defendant’s intentional tort and breach of her 
fiduciary duty.238 The accounting defendant gives up her gains 
from third parties instead of giving back gains she obtained from 
the plaintiff.239 Accounting lacks both of the constructive trust 
characteristics: it neither requires nor allows tracing and it ends 
with a money judgment that ranks equally with the defendant’s 
other unsecured debts.240  
The successful accounting plaintiff’s measure of recovery is 
the greater of the defendant’s “net profit” or the gain’s “market 
value.”241 The court measures the plaintiff’s 
accounting-disgorgement restitution by the defendant’s gain from 
third-party sources, recovery that may exceed the plaintiff’s 
loss.242 A court imposes the harsh measurement rules of 
accounting-disgorgement restitution to “eliminate the possibility 
of [defendant’s] profit from conscious wrongdoing.”243 As defined 
in the Restatement, contemporary accounting-disgorgement 
                                                                                                     
 237. See Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution, supra note 216, at 994 
(“Accounting . . . is a vehicle for equitable restitution that is not based on a res 
or fund . . . [I]t captures the defendant’s gains from other sources.”). 
 238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 51 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that restitution measured by a 
defendant’s wrongdoing has been referred to as both a “disgorgement” and as an 
“accounting”). 
 239. See Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution, supra note 216, at 994–95 
(explaining that a successful accounting plaintiff is not limited to recovering 
only her former property, but may capture gains obtained from other sources). 
 240. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 51 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (describing the relation of asset based remedies 
in restitution and stating that the successful accounting plaintiffs have a 
judgment that ranks equally with the rights of competing creditors and 
unsecured creditors); WILLIAM DE FUNIAK, A HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 
§ 103 (2d ed. 1956) (explaining the priority of an accounting judgment). See 
generally PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 1.5(c). 
 241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. § 51 cmt. c, 3.  
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includes a third-party wrongdoer unrelated to the plaintiff and is 
not limited to fiduciary relationships, but it turns on the 
defendant’s intentional misconduct leading to unjust 
enrichment.244 
Accounting is a complex and confusing subject, primarily 
because it has not shed its accumulated pre-merger barnacles.245 
Professor Eichengrun wrote that accounting functions as several 
different remedies.246 The equitable bill of accounting began to 
compel an express trustee to account to the trust’s beneficiaries 
for the management of the trust, which was under the Chancery 
court’s exclusive jurisdiction.247 Accounting was extended to an 
accounting incidental to another equitable remedy, a constructive 
trust.248 A contemporary accounting can accompany a 
constructive trust, but today an accounting plaintiff need not 
trace, identify an asset,249 an injunction,250 or specific 
performance.251 An accounting for discovery is obsolete because 
contemporary civil discovery rules apply to all lawsuits.252 The 
                                                                                                     
 244. Id. § 51. See generally Joel Eichengrun, Remedying the Remedy of 
Accounting, 60 IND. L.J. 463, 482–83 (1985). 
 245. See Cleland v. Stadt, 670 F. Supp. 814, 818 (N.D. Ill. 1987) 
(complexity); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Candy Club, 501 N.E.2d 188, 190 (Ill. 
App. 1986) (discovery); Jackson v. Cty. of Douglas, 388 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Neb. 
1986) (complexity). 
 246. Eichengrun, supra note 244, at 482–83. 
 247. See id. at n.29 (speaking to the historical development of the bill of 
accounting). 
 248. See Rust v. Kelly, 741 P.2d 786, 787 (Mont. 1987) (applying an 
accounting to members of joint land development venture); Palazzo v. Palazzo, 
503 N.Y.S.2d 381, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (same in divorce proceeding); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (relating the principle of accounting to other remedies, 
including a constructive trust). 
 249. See Newby v. Enron, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 706 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (“A 
plaintiff seeking an equitable accounting rather than a constructive trust need 
not identify a particular asset or fund of money in the defendant’s possession to 
which she is entitled.”). 
 250. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916) 
(“[T]he jurisdiction must be rested upon some other equitable ground—in 
ordinary cases, as in the present, the right to an injunction. . . .”).  
 251.  Eichengrun, supra note 244, at 482. 
 252. See Alts. Unlimited, Inc. v. New Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 843 
A.2d 252, 307–08 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (“It is now clear, moreover, that 
whereas an equitable claim for an accounting once served a necessary discovery 
function, that function has been superseded by modern rules of discovery.”). For 
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Supreme Court in Dairy Queen v. Wood253 de-emphasized the 
claimant’s need for an accounting when the parties’ accounts are 
complicated because of the judge’s ability to appoint a master.254 
Accounting wasidentified with fiduciary relations like a trustee of 
an express trust, above, or the agent-principal relationships here 
examined.255  
Because the plaintiff’s remedy for accounting-disgorgement 
is a money judgment, the question arises whether the parties 
have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the federal or 
state constitutions. There are two dominant tests for a federal 
constitutional jury right: the remedies test, which is the most 
important, and the historical test.256 The issue of jury trial for an 
accounting is complex because it merges three amorphous and 
unfamiliar terms: equity, fiduciary, and accounting. 
In Dairy Queen, the leading Supreme Court decision 
examining accounting under the federal Seventh Amendment, 
Justice Black held that a franchiser’s lawsuit for an “accounting” 
seeking breach of contract and trademark infringement remedies 
from a former franchisee led to a right to a jury.257 Dairy Queen is 
subject to at least three varying interpretations,258 which we 
discuss below. 
Dairy Queen followed a remedies test for jury trial. Under a 
historical test, however, an accounting is equitable.259 Following 
                                                                                                     
further discussion, see Eichengrun, supra note 244, at 475–76. 
 253. 369 U.S. 459, 478 (1962). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Eichengrum, supra note 244, at 474 (iterating that accounting typically 
arose in cases involving a fiduciary relationship). 
 256. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) (“We reiterate our 
previously expressed view that characterizing the relief sought is ‘more 
important’ than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action in 
determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial.”). For 
further analysis of the two tests, see RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 
345–47.  
 257. See id. at 477–78 (declaring that a right to a jury trial is not dependent 
on the litigant’s “choice of words used in the pleadings,” but that the court must 
examine the circumstances of the case to determine if it gives rise to a jury trial 
or not).  
 258. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 
1059 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (describing the various ways courts have applied to 
determine whether a jury trial is guaranteed ). 
 259. See Phillips v. Kaplus, 864 F.2d 807, 813 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that 
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a historical test, money defendant obtained from plaintiff by 
abuse of fiduciary of confidential relationship is equitable.260 The 
lack of a coercive remedy is irrelevant. Courts have held an 
accounting will not be tried to a jury.261 
Because of the remedies test, my answer to the jury trial 
question is an inconclusive one.262 If the plaintiff’s complaint 
demands money, then a jury right may exist.263 A restitution 
plaintiff’s recovery of money is usually legal restitution.264 Legal 
restitution includes plaintiff’s recovery of a converter’s proceeds 
from a profitable sale, traditionally named waiver of tort and suit 
in assumpsit.265 An accounting that leads to a money judgment, 
not a trust or a lien, may be subject to a jury right under Dairy 
Queen.266 An accounting decision that is a non-coercive money 
judgment “might be thought to require a jury trial.”267  
                                                                                                     
accounting is “traditionally” equitable); DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 
111, § 2.6(3) (“The remedy known as accounting or accounting for profits is 
usually regarded as equitable, but it can ultimately resemble a money 
judgment.”); PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.12 (“[R]ecovery 
of profits is associated with equitable accounting . . . .”). 
 260. See generally PALMER, supra note 5, §§ 1.3, 1.6.  
 261. See Kaplus, 864 F.2d at 813 (finding that accounting is “traditionally” 
equitable); Levitin v. Rosenthal, 903 F. Supp. 400, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“An 
accounting is an action in equity to be tried by the court without a jury . . . .”); 
Dick v. Dick, 355 A.2d 110, 116 (Conn. 1974) (“It is well settled that ‘where the 
essential right asserted is equitable in its nature and damages are sought in 
lieu of equitable relief or as supplemental to it . . . the whole action is one in 
equity and there is no right to a jury trial.”). See generally Henderson v. Ayres 
& Hartnett, P.C., 740 S.E.2d 518, 522 (Va. 2013); Van de Kamp v. Bank of Am., 
251 Cal. Rptr. 530, 552–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) .  
 262. See Caprice Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 10) (discussing the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 263. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §§ 2.6(3) n.22, 4.3(5) 
(accounting for profits is like a money judgment); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2310 (3d ed. 1998) (“An accounting remedy is similar 
to a damage remedy, . . . .”). 
 264. See Colleen Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 56 SMU L. 
REV. 1572, 1598–1607 (2002) (explaining the legal and equitable “facets” of 
restitution). 
 265. See PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 1.5 (providing 
examples of when courts have allowed a plaintiff to recover the proceeds of a 
sale when goods were wrongfully converted).  
 266. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 2.6(3) (speaking to the 
application of Dairy Queen in subsequent cases). 
 267. Id. § 2.6(3). 
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On the other hand, Dairy Queen may mean that a pleader 
cannot avoid a jury trial by characterizing a breach of contract 
claim for damages as equitable by re-naming it an accounting.268 
If the plaintiff calls contract damages an accounting, then the 
novel characterization of “common law” as equitable will fail; the 
plaintiff’s claim will be subject to the litigants’ jury right.269 
The constructive trust and the equitable lien are asset-based 
or proprietary remedies because the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment originated with the plaintiff.270 An accounting is not 
an asset-based or proprietary remedy; the defendant’s unjust 
enrichment came from others, not the plaintiff.271 In the 
commercial bribery dispute we are following, defendant Aggie is 
liable to the plaintiff and must account for or disgorge her unjust 
enrichment. But the fund originated from Sailer, a third person, 
not from Beyer, the plaintiff. If the plaintiff seeks restitution of 
defendant’s gains from other sources, is that claim legal or 
equitable? Courts have required a jury for the plaintiff to recover 
defendant’s profits from copyright infringement and trademark 
infringement.272 
                                                                                                     
 268. See Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 814 (11th Cir. 1985) (examining 
whether the case at issue was truly equitable or if it was a case typically settled 
at law that was being disguised as an equitable claim); Douglas Laycock, Death 
of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 757–58 (1991) (“A few 
plaintiffs may manipulate the choice of remedy to deprive defendants of their 
right to jury trial, but this risk does not extend widely . . . . This risk of 
manipulation in a small number of cases cannot justify a preference for legal 
remedies in all cases.”). 
 269. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) (“The constitutional 
right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in 
the pleadings.”). 
 270. See generally Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution, supra note 216. 
 271. See id. at 994 (“Accounting . . . captures the defendant’s gains from 
other sources.”). 
 272. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 
1065 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (discussing the conflicting precedent and other courts’ 
confused and muddled reasoning and finding a jury right in a case concerning 
patent infringement). The decision in Black & Decker Corp. may be based on the 
idea that because restitution is “equitable,” there is no right to a jury trial, a 
mistake referred to as the “equity fallacy” in Rendleman & Roberts, supra note 
1, at 493–94. See generally, Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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Will the judge employ a coercive order to pay to enforce an 
accounting remedy?273 An order to turn over property or money 
that the judge has found the defendant possesses does not 
imprison the defendant to collect a civil debt.274 However, an 
order to pay a money judgment enforced by coercive contempt 
may lead to the defendant’s imprisonment to collect a civil 
debt.275 The possibility of coercive confinement militates against 
an equitable classification of accounting.276  
In personam relief—the judge’s order to the defendant to 
convey—is equitable.277 The plaintiff’s claim that requires 
tracing, enforced by a judge with an order to convey, is 
equitable.278 Tracing for either profit-based restitution or specific 
restitution to reach another asset is equitable in United States 
law.279 The plaintiff may need to trace the res through changes in 
form or into the hands of a third person or because the defendant 
is insolvent.280  
If an accounting plaintiff is suing to recover a fund that has 
been traced, the case seems to be equitable, and therefore not 
subject to a constitutional jury right. My tentative answer is to 
advise an equitable restitution plaintiff who traces and seeks to 
avoid a jury trial to sue for a constructive trust with a possible 
coercive remedy.  
My tentative solution for the right to a jury trial is, first, to 
subscribe to a remedies test for the right to a jury trial and, 
second, to approve a constitutional right to jury trial for an 
accounting that will lead to a money judgment rather than to a 
coercive order.  
                                                                                                     
 273. See generally DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §§ 1.1, 2.6(3). 
 274. See generally DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, 
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 703–04 (2010). 
 275. See id. at 702–703 (providing examples of when a court uses coercive 
contempt to enforce a court ordered monetary obligation). 
 276. See id. at 790–91 (coercive contempt may violate the prohibition 
against debtors’ prisons). 
 277. For examples and discussion of the intersection of equity and in 
personam jurisdiction, see Howard W. Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 ARK. L. 
NOTES 29, 30. 
 278. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.12. 
 279. See generally id. § 2.14. 
 280. For more extensive discussion, see Murphy, supra note 264, at 1598–
1607.  
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Professor Kull—later the Restatement’s Reporter—expressed 
the difficulty of administering the law-equity characterization 
when he wrote that the plaintiff’s restitution against the 
intentional converter is either legal or equitable.281 
It is appropriate to conclude my discussion of the 
constitutional jury right in an accounting by emphasizing its 
tentative nature. A recent accounting decision where a 
trademark plaintiff sued to recover defendant’s profits may have 
been based on the unexpressed incorrect premise that all 
restitution is equitable.282 The court found a constitutional right 
to jury; it based its conclusion on the idea that the plaintiff’s 
trademark infringement claim for an accounting of the 
defendant’s profits stemmed from policies of unjust enrichment, 
deterrence, and compensation.283 The accounting was 
compensatory because defendant’s profits may be a “proxy” or 
“rough measure” that can measure plaintiff’s damages.284 
3. Constructive Trust or Accounting? 
Sometimes either a constructive trust or an accounting will 
be appropriate. When the defendant still has the money and does 
not have any other creditors, there is not any difference between 
an accounting and a constructive trust.285 
Suppose Sailer bribed Aggie with $8,000 in cash that Aggie 
later invested in a propitious commodity trade that doubled its 
                                                                                                     
 281. Andrew Kull, Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer, 11 J. CONT. 
L. 93, 100 (1997). 
 282. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Positec USA, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 
1064 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (resolving that a trademark holder had a Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial on claims demanding alleged infringers’ profits). 
 283. See id. at 1061 (finding that an accounting in the context of a 
trademark infringement case may be based on “unjust enrichment, deterrence, 
and compensation”). 
 284. See id. at 1067 (“Plaintiffs appear to have a viable theory that profits 
serve as a proxy for damages.”).  
 285. See Matthew Harding, Constructive Trusts and Distributive Justice, in 
PRINCIPLES OF PROPRIETARY REMEDIES 20, 34 (Elise Bant & Michael Bryan eds., 
2013) (“Note, though, that if an account of profits is able to achieve the same 
measure of disgorgement as a constructive trust, it might be neither here nor 
there, from the perspective of distributive justice, which remedy is awarded (at 
least in a two party case).”). 
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value. May Beyer recover $16,000? According to constructive 
trust tracing principles, the plaintiff’s recovery would include the 
gains and profits she made.286 Strict constructive trust reasoning 
leads to stripping all profit from the fiduciary.287 An agent who 
invests the bribe successfully is responsible to “account for all the 
profits of [her] wrongdoing to the principal, consistently with the 
courts goal of maintaining ‘a very high standard of conduct on the 
part of fiduciaries.’”288 The counterargument is that the agent 
should account for only the bribe because her gains and profits 
cannot be traced back to either the plaintiff’s asset or the 
plaintiff’s opportunity.289  
In two foundational decisions, one American, the other 
British, the defendants published books based on national 
security information and received royalties from their 
publishers.290 Each court imposed a constructive trust on its 
defendant’s royalties in favor of the respective governments.291 
The United States Supreme Court found that Snepp, the 
defendant in Snepp v. United States,292 had breached a fiduciary 
duty as a substantive prerequisite for the constructive trust.293 
The House of Lords based its constructive trust on the defendant 
Blake’s breach of contract.294  
                                                                                                     
 286. See Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution, supra note 216, at 992–93 
(explaining that tracing ends where the money ends and that the plaintiff may 
recover profits as long as she can trace to them). 
 287. See id. at 994 (describing the mechanisms of strict tracing). 
 288. Charles Mitchell, Civil Liability for Bribery, 117 L.Q. REV. 207, 213 
(2001). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT §§ 51(4), 55(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 289. See generally id. § 61 cmt. b. 
 290. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Attorney Gen. v. Blake, 
[2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). 
 291. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515 (“A constructive trust, on the other hand, 
protects both the Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. 
This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a breach of trust.”); 
Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) (“[C]ircumstances do arise when the just response 
to a breach of contract is that the wrongdoer should not be permitted to retain 
any profit from the breach.”). 
 292. 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 293. Id. at 515. The Supreme Court didn’t adjust the amount of the 
constructive trust for the time Snepp spent writing the book. Id. 
 294. See Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL) (comparing the case at bar to Blake 
and noting the number of factual similarities). Although in some contexts the 
difference between a constructive trust and an accounting is important, the 
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Although Beyer can respond that the bribe Aggie received 
from Sailer was a discount that he was entitled to receive,295 the 
argument that the seller’s bribe was built back into the price the 
principal paid the seller fails completely in both national security 
decisions.296 Snepp’s and Blake’s enrichment came from the book 
buyers and the publishers, not the governments; neither was 
enriched at the expense of the government.297 Both plaintiffs 
wanted their agents to follow their covenants.298 Each would 
have eschewed royalties from an agent’s book that it did not want 
published. Neither the “at the expense of” nor the “discount” 
description explains the decisions.  
The late Professor Peter Birks rejected the concept of a 
constructive trust with tracing unless the defendant’s enrichment 
was subtracted from the plaintiff’s ownership.299 In technical 
restitution language, the defendants’ enrichment did not come 
“at the expense of” the governments. Neither diverted a benefit 
that would otherwise have gone to his government. As discussed 
above, the Restatement of Restitution rejected Birks’s argument 
for giving-up restitution.300 Although section one of the 
Restatement states that defendant’s enrichment must be “at the 
expense of” a plaintiff, “at the expense of” can mean the 
defendant may have acquired title “in violation of the [plaintiff’s] 
rights.”301 
                                                                                                     
Restatement of Restitution is indifferent to the substantive basis, contract vs. 
fiduciary, that leads to the constructive trust. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see 
also Roy Ryden Anderson, The Compensatory Disgorgement Alternative to 
Restatement Third's New Remedy for Breach of Contract, 68 SMU L. REV. 953, 
1001–03 nn.294–311 (2015) (Snepp’s fiduciary obligation “concocted”; Blake’s 
constructive trust “carefully reasoned”). 
 295. See Cty. of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 855–57 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2007) (discussing the defendant’s argument that the county did not 
incur any damage by his taking of bribes, and ultimately rejecting the 
argument). 
 296. See infra notes 274–279. 
 297. See generally Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Attorney 
Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). 
 298. Snepp, 444 U.S.; Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). 
 299. BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 129, at 387–89. 
 300. See generally supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 1 
cmt. 1, 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see also Cty. of Cook v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540, 
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A court may require a constructive trust plaintiff to trace its 
asset into the defendant’s hands.302 Equitable restitution 
implemented through a constructive trust gave the government a 
special priority right in Snepp’s and Blake’s enrichment.303 In 
Snepp and Blake, however, some would maintain, accounting or 
disgorgement would be a more technically accurate remedy than 
a constructive trust.304  
What supports the courts’ decisions to award the plaintiffs 
constructive trusts and special priority rights in the defendants’ 
royalties? If the defendants had other creditors, were the 
royalties sufficiently identified with the plaintiffs or with the 
defendants’ wrongs to qualify for constructive trust status? The 
chancellor in Daraydan Holdings, Limited v. Sollard 
International, Limited305 wrote:  
There are powerful policy reasons for ensuring that a fiduciary 
does not retain gains acquired in violation of fiduciary duty, 
and I do not consider that it should make any difference 
whether the fiduciary is insolvent. There is no injustice to the 
[fiduciary’s] creditors in their not sharing in an asset for 
which the fiduciary has not given value, and which the 
fiduciary should not have had.306  
We think that the respective governments’ claims to 
royalties would outrank Snepp’s and Blake’s other creditors. 
Similarly, Aggie’s enrichment came from Sailer. Was Aggie 
unjustly enriched “at the expense” of Beyer? Unlike Aggie and 
                                                                                                     
544 (Ill. Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting the argument that defendant’s enrichment 
from the briber was not “at the expense” of plaintiff). 
 302. See Bender v. CenTrust Mort. Corp., 51 F.3d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 
1995) (“[I]t is well settled that Florida courts will impress property with a 
constructive trust only if the trust res is specific, identifiable property or if it 
can be clearly traced in assets of the defendant which are claimed by the party 
seeking such relief.” (citation omitted)). 
 303. See generally Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Attorney 
Gen. v. Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). 
 304. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
 305. [2004] EWHC (Ch.) 662 [86] (Eng.). 
 306. Id. Disagreeing, Professor Burrows wrote that “[I]t is hard to see why a 
victim claiming restitution for a wrong should have priority on the wrongdoer’s 
insolvency given that a compensation-claimant does not have such priority.” 
ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 687 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
BURROWS, RESTITUTION]; see also BURROWS, REMEDIES, supra note 111, at 619. 
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the agent-defendant in Daraydan Holdings, Snepp and Blake 
were not the kind of agent-fiduciaries who manage property or 
conduct business for a principal.307 Their governments cannot 
argue that the defendants diverted royalties that would have 
otherwise accrued to them. If Aggie’s enrichment came from 
Sailer, do the preceding points support giving Beyer a 
constructive trust with priority rights over Aggie and her other 
creditors? The principal’s trust and confidence, and the need to 
suppress bribery, both support tracing.308 The origin of the bribe 
militates against it.  
A constructive trust that captures the trust res’s 
appreciation may, however, under some circumstances, be too 
generous to the plaintiff. Another possible equitable remedy is an 
equitable lien in the particular asset; that remedy would allow 
the plaintiff to trace the bribe money, award the plaintiff a 
security interest in it, and let the plaintiff recover it without 
capturing its appreciation.309 If a constructive trust, in Dobbs’s 
words, “overkills,” then the judge may impose an equitable 
lien.310 If the defendant is insolvent and the commercial-bribery 
plaintiff is competing with the defendant’s creditors who were not 
connected with the defendant’s wrong, the Australian court in 
Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N.L. (No. 2),311 suggested 
awarding the plaintiff an equitable lien instead of a constructive 
trust.312 
Under United Kingdom law, the difference between the two 
forms of equitable restitution, constructive trust or an 
accounting, becomes critical. In 2014 in FHR European Ventures, 
                                                                                                     
 307. For a description of the roles of Snepp and Blake in their respective 
cases, see Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) and Attorney General. v. 
Blake, [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). 
 308. See United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A 
constructive trust is imposed on the bribes not because Holzer intercepted 
money intended for the state or failed to account for money received on the 
state’s account but in order to deter bribery by depriving the bribed official of 
the benefit of the bribes.”). 
 309. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 56 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 310. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §§ 4.3(2), 4.3(3). 
 311. [2012] 200 FCR 296 (Austl.).  
 312. Id. 
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LLP v. Mankarious,313 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
considered a secret commission a buyer had paid to the seller’s 
agent.314 Was the seller’s remedy an accounting or a constructive 
trust?  
The difference was important. An accounting eschews 
tracing for a personal remedy, a judgment for money.315 The 
United Kingdom remedy of constructive trust is “proprietary,” 
not “remedial.” The plaintiff traces his property—the trust res—
and both captures the defendant’s investment gain and outranks 
defendant’s other creditors in the asset.  
The distinction between the constructive trust and 
accounting—Etherton, L.J., wrote for the Court of Appeal 
below—had been “difficult to fit coherently into a neat set of 
rules.”316 Policy was difficult for the Court of Appeal to sort out:  
In considering those matters, there are important issues of 
policy, and the relative importance of different policies, to 
assess, including deterring fraud and corruption; the ability to 
strip the fiduciary of all benefits, including increases in the 
value of benefits, acquired by breach of duty, and vehicles or 
third parties through which those benefits have been 
channelled; the importance attached to the protection of those 
to whom fiduciary duties are owed; and the position of other 
creditors on the fiduciary’s insolvency who may be prejudiced 
by a constructive trust or proprietary relief in favour of the 
fiduciary’s principal but who, in the absence of such a trust 
and relief, would benefit from increases in value of assets 
acquired by the fiduciary’s fraud, corruption or wrongdoing. It 
will also be necessary to bear in mind the international 
perspective applying to this area of trust law and equity, to 
which I have referred earlier in this judgment.317  
Because of the United Kingdom’s constructive trust’s 
property base and unruly precedents, the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom’s decision in Mankarious took on some of the 
                                                                                                     
 313. [2014] UKSC 45 (appeal taken from EWCA Civ). 
 314. Id.; FHR European Ventures, LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 
17 (appeal taken from EWCA Ch. Div.). 
 315. See generally Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Tex. 
2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. 
b (AM. LAW INST. 2011); PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 1.5(c). 
 316. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 17 at para. 15. 
 317. Id. at para. 116.  
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earmarks of driving a square peg into a round hole. The court 
appears to have located the seller’s asset in a price that 
seemingly had been increased by the amount of the bribe.318 The 
court examined tangled and unruly precedent:  
It shows that the mere fact that the fiduciary obtains the 
benefit from a third party, or obtains a benefit that could 
never be or would never be obtained by the principal, or that 
the principal has obtained what he or she wanted or intended 
from the opportunity, is not necessarily a bar to a constructive 
trust of the benefit wrongly obtained by the fiduciary by 
taking advantage of the opportunity.319  
The bent agent, the court found, held the secret commission 
as a constructive trustee.320  
The agent always accounts to the principal for the amount of 
the bribe “by way of equitable compensation,” a personal and 
restitutionary remedy.321 In addition, the agent may hold the 
bribe in a constructive trust.322 The Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom stated the rule: in some cases, “where an agent acquires 
a benefit which came to his notice as a result of his fiduciary 
position or pursuant to an opportunity which results from his 
fiduciary position,” the court will treat the agent as having 
acquired the asset “on behalf of his principal” and treat the 
principal as the beneficial owner.323 Does the rule apply to a 
bribe, an asset that cannot be traced to the principal?324 
The issue is whether the principal’s recovery of the agent’s 
bribe is a “proprietary claim” “held by the agent on [constructive] 
trust for his principal” or is the principal’s claim “for equitable 
compensation in a sum equal to the bribe.”325 The court noted the 
                                                                                                     
 318.  Id. at para. 67 (“What Investor Group has been deprived of is the 
opportunity to have purchased the hotel for up to €10 million less than they 
paid for it.”). 
 319. Id. at para. 100. 
 320. FHR European Ventures, LLP v. Cedar Capitol Partners, LLC, [2014] 
UKSC 45 [para. 7] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). 
 321. Id. at para. 6. 
 322. See id. at para. 7 (explaining that the principal can elect between a 
propriety remedy and a personal remedy against the agent).  
 323. Id.  
 324. See id. at para. 7–9 (stating that the “rule” has been strictly applied in 
numerous cases). 
 325. Id. at para. 1. 
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 423 
two differences between the constructive trust and the 
accounting: the constructive trust plaintiff who holds a 
proprietary claim (1) may trace and (2) outranks the agent’s 
general creditors in the asset.326 Does the principal also have a 
proprietary remedy? 
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom cited the Privy 
Council’s decision in Attorney General v. Reid,327 which held that 
the bribed prosecuting attorney held the bribe money as a 
constructive trust that can be traced to his house.328 The Court 
adduced several policy reasons to support its decision that the 
bribe led to a constructive trust, not an account: to suppress 
anomalies, to regard the bribe as a potential price reduction, and 
to deter bribes.329  
The court did not think that bribes had much effect on the 
agent’s general creditors.330 Other common law jurisdictions, 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, and 
Canada, consider that all benefits are in trust.331 Courts should 
learn from each other and harmonize the common law.332 In fact, 
                                                                                                     
 326. See id. at para. 42 (discussing that if a principal has a proprietary 
claim to the bribe, he can trace and follow it in equity and that if the agent 
becomes insolvent, a propriety claim would give the principal priority over 
agent’s unsecured creditors). 
 327. Attorney General for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal 
taken from NZCA) (UK). 
 328. See FHR European Ventures, LLP v. Cedar Capitol Partners, LLC 
[2014] UKSC 45 [para. 28] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)) (describing the 
reasoning of the Privy Council in Attorney General for Hong Kong v. Reid [1994] 
1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal taken from NZCA) (UK)). 
 329. See id. at para. 42 (“Wider policy considerations also support the 
respondents’ case that bribes and secret commissions received by an agent 
should be treated as property of his principal, rather than merely giving rise to 
a claim for equitable compensation.”). 
 330. See id. at para. 43 (explaining that a bribe would not have much of an 
effect on the agent’s creditors because the proceeds of a bribe should not be in 
the agent’s estate and bribes often reduce the benefit of the relevant transaction 
and can fairly be said to be property of the principal). 
 331. See FHR European Ventures, LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 
17 [para. 80] (appeal taken from EWCA (Ch)) (explaining that the law in 
England and Wales differs not only from Australia, but also New Zealand, 
Singapore, Canada and some United States jurisdictions). 
 332. See Cedar Capitol Partners, [2014] UKSC 4 at para. 46 (“[I]t seems to 
us highly desirable for all those jurisdictions to learn from eachother, and at 
least to lean in favor of harmonizing the development of the common law round 
the world.”). 
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the events and contracts in the lawsuit were in foreign nations on 
the continent, but United Kingdom law applied, probably because 
of a choice-of-law clause.333 
One questionable feature of the decision was to reject the 
remedial constructive trust and to retain artificial property-based 
constructive trust.334 If the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom had followed Australian Judge Paul Finn’s 2012 
decision in Grimaldi v. Chameleon Mining N.L. (No 2),335 it 
would have spared itself from technical distinctions and a labored 
conclusion. Although Grimaldi involved corporate misconduct, 
Judge Finn discussed the closely related bribery precedents.336  
The United Kingdom constructive trust is property-based: it 
“requires a claimant to show that he previously owned the very 
property in which he now claims an interest, or else that the 
defendant acquired this property in exchange for property that 
was previously owned by the claimant.”337 In the United 
Kingdom, a constructive trust is “yes” or “no” depending on 
matching the facts with the elements. The judge lacks 
discretion.338  
Judge Finn’s policy-based approach is functional; it rejects a 
property prerequisite in favor of results that implement relevant 
policies.339 He based the distinction between a constructive trust 
and accounting on “the cardinal principal of equity that the 
remedy must be fashioned to fit the nature of the case and the 
particular facts.”340 The defendant’s constructive trust is “not 
                                                                                                     
 333. Id. at para. 24; FHR European Ventures v. Mankarious [2011] EWHC 
2308 (Ch). [24].  
 334. See generally FHR European Ventures v. Mankarious [2014] UKSC 45 
[47] (Ch.). 
 335. [2012] 200 FCR 296 (Austl.).  
 336. Id at 418–23.  
 337. GOFF & JONES, THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 37-10 (Charles 
Mitchell, Paul Mitchell & Stephen Watterson eds., 8th ed. 2011). Professor 
Burrows is less technical. The defendant’s unjust enrichment “exists in . . . [the 
defendant’s] surviving asset.” BURROWS, RESTITUTION, supra note 306, at 173. 
 338. GOFF & JONES, supra note 337, at 38-17.  
 339. See Grimaldi [2012] 200 FCR 296 at 403 (“It is the case that, in many 
instances and for many types of equitable wrong, the remedy that is the most 
appropriate will self select absent unusual circumstances.”). 
 340. Id. 
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based on inflexible formulae.”341 The “liability arises as a matter 
of conscience not of property.”342 Property-based United Kingdom 
constructive trust law is too narrow, in part because it rejects 
discretion in choosing a constructive trust.343 In Australia, a 
bribe leads to a constructive trust: the plaintiff captures the 
profits the defendant earned with the trust money.344  
Judge Finn found principles of confinement in appropriate 
and practical justice.345 Discretion to award a remedy means not 
always awarding it.346 The countervailing considerations are 
predictability, avoiding excessive recovery, whether another 
appropriate remedy exists, and consideration of the parties’ 
future relations. A constructive trust is not “penal;” its purpose is 
to prevent the defendant’s unjust enrichment, not to punish 
him.347 Finally, if the plaintiff seeks to capture the constructive 
trust asset’s appreciation, the judge’s discretion may adjust the 
measurement of the constructive trust for the defendant’s time 
and skill spent in achieving that appreciation.348  
Judge Finn’s decision boosts the precedential value of the 
Privy Council’s decision in Reid349 over earlier incongruent 
United Kingdom decisions. But he observed in the same 
paragraph that Australia disagrees with Reid on when a 
                                                                                                     
 341. Id. at 357–58. See generally GOFF & JONES, supra note 337, at 37-24.  
 342. Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N.L. (No. 2) [2012] 200 FCR 296, 381 
(Austl.). 
 343. Id. at 420. 
 344. Id. at 420, 431. 
 345. See id. at 403 (referencing “the ‘principle of appropriateness’ and the 
requirement to do ‘practical justice’”). 
 346. See id. at 423 (indicating that a constructive trust need not necessarily 
be imposed if there are other orders capable of doing full justice). 
 347. See id. at 406, 410 (explaining that because a constructive trust is 
confined to profits actually made, its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, 
not to punish); see also United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp. 
2d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2008) (arguing that disgorgement may not be used punitively). 
 348. Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining N.L. (No. 2) [2012] 200 FCR 296, 410, 
450, 453 (Austl.). Before the Court of Appeals’ decision in Mankarious, Professor 
Burrows had written approvingly of a similar result—measurement of the 
constructive trust could be adjusted by granting the judge discretion to adjust 
the amount of restitution in consideration of the defendant’s time and skill. 
BURROWS, REMEDIES, supra note 111, at 620. 
 349. Attorney General for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 (appeal 
taken from NZCA) (UK). 
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constructive trust begins.350 In New Zealand, a constructive trust 
commences under property concepts upon the defendant’s receipt 
of the bribe in contrast to Australia, where the court has 
equitable discretion to set the effective date according to policy 
and context.351  
A court deciding the remedy for a commercial bribery should 
have equitable discretion to decide that, if the defendant 
deliberately breached her fiduciary duty by receiving a bribe and 
made profits, the plaintiff may recover the defendant’s bribe and 
her profits as a constructive trustee.352 The court ought to 
consider the defendant’s general creditors’ plight, real or 
imagined.353 Generalized concern that the constructive trust 
overreaches the defendant’s general creditors should not be the 
basis for a general rule against a constructive trust.  
Like the Australian constructive trust, the constructive trust 
in the United States is flexible, pragmatic, and remedial, 
although with variations from state to state.354 As the Reporter of 
the Third Restatement of Restitution, Professor Andrew Kull 
wrote: 
[I]t is nothing less than extraordinary, to a U.S. lawyer, to 
hear anyone . . . describe a constructive trust as a species of 
trust. To us this seems just as old-fashioned, and just as 
fundamentally misleading, as to describe a quasi-contractual 
                                                                                                     
 350. See Grimaldi [2012] 200 FCR at 422 (“Reid has the constructive trust 
arising the moment the bribe is received. In Australia, the constructive trust in 
this setting is a discretionary remedy.”). 
 351. Id. 
 352. See Graham Virgo, Whose Conscience? Unconscionability in the 
Common Law of Obligations 35 (unpublished manuscript) (“Personal liability 
for unjust enrichment can be converted into a proprietary claim by virtue of the 
defendant’s subjective fault.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Mitchell, supra note 288, at 209–10 (discussing constructive trusts 
under English law). 
 353. See Anthony Mason, The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the 
Contemporary Common Law World, 110 L.Q. REV. 238, 253 (1994)  
[T]he impact upon general creditors of proprietary relief and 
equitable interests not registered as charges has been recognised as a 
concern in other contexts as equity intrudes into the commercial 
world via the Quistclose trust and the Romalpa clause and as the 
substantive principles of equity and the common law converge. 
 354. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 55, 58 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (indicating that courts have discretion on 
conditioning the surrender of the constructive trust property). 
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obligation as a species of contract. Enlightenment on this 
point came to U.S. lawyers over a century ago . . . . We see the 
constructive trust as a remedy for certain cases . . . . We do not 
spend any time worrying about the distinction between a 
“remedial constructive trust” and some other [proprietary] 
kind, because no U.S. lawyer has ever heard that there is any 
other kind.355 
A United States judge should have the discretion and 
flexibility to choose between a constructive trust and an 
accounting-disgorgement in Beyer’s lawsuit against Aggie 
according to the judge’s sense of where justice lies.  
III. Civil Remedies: The Employer Sues the Briber 
Suppose, for now, that Aggie is beyond the reach of Beyer’s 
legal process. Or Aggie is obviously broke. When Beyer scans the 
horizon for deep-pocket defendants, he spots Sailer. Sailer 
facilitated Aggie’s violation of her fiduciary duty to Beyer. 
Sailer’s bribe deprived Beyer of Aggie’s judgment and loyalty. 
Sailer, the briber, is a wrongdoer even if Aggie had refused the 
bribe. Sailer may be liable to Beyer.  
First a detour. Suppose Aggie “suggested” to Sailer that her 
home speakers were inadequate. She more than hinted that new 
speakers would facilitate her decision to buy Sailer’s for Beyer. 
Setting aside Sailer’s option to exit and, perhaps, to speak to the 
authorities or to Beyer, Sailer, in short, may have been the victim 
of Aggie’s “extortion.” If so, we think that Sailer escapes both 
criminal liability356 and civil liability.357 In City of New York v. 
Liberman,358 the court wrote that although “the distinction 
between bribe and extortion is a fine one,” it is an important line 
for a court to draw.359 The payer of a bribe is liable, but a victim 
                                                                                                     
 355. Andrew Kull, Deconstructing the Constructive Trust, 40 CAN. BUS. L.J. 
358, 359 (2004). 
 356. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[A] person is 
not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) he is a 
victim of that offense.”). See generally NOONAN, supra note 12, at 638. 
 357. See Woods, supra note 199, at 956–57, 957 n.189 (describing the 
analysis of New York v. Liberman, 232 A.D.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)). 
 358. 232 A.D.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).  
 359. Id. at 44. 
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of extortion is not liable for the payments that they were induced 
to make.360 
A. The Briber’s Duty? 
Sailer is not a fiduciary for Beyer. His “contract” with Aggie 
is illegal and unenforceable.361 What kind of legal duty did Sailer 
breach? He may be a joint tortfeasor with Aggie.362 Or he may 
have committed the tort of inducing Aggie to breach her contract 
with Beyer.363  
A New Jersey court took the employer’s search for a 
defendant a step farther by finding a third party to a bribery 
scheme liable as a joint tortfeasor.364 A lawyer agreed to act as a 
conduit for a bribery scheme involving a contractor and a public 
official.365 The lawyer retained a $96,000 fee from the contractor 
for passing on a bribe for a city contract to the official.366 
                                                                                                     
 360. See id. (“In the case of extortion, however, the one who is victimized by 
an extortion will not be held civilly liable for the amount of such payments.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 361. See Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the 
Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 
555 (1980) (examining restitution where party fails to fulfill illegal contract to 
injure another); Commercial Bribery, supra note 36, at 801 (observing that 
criminal statutes have been passed that declare the corrupt influencing of an 
agent, servant, or employee to be a misdemeanor).  
 362. See Cont’l Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613, 619 (Ct. Cl. 1975) 
(“[T]here is support for this result in views of the courts that have declared that 
all knowing participants in a scheme involving an agent’s breach of duty may be 
held jointly liable . . . .”); Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 
S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. 1942) (“It is settled as the law of this State that where a 
third party knowingly participates in the breach of a duty of a fiduciary, such 
third party becomes a joint tortfeasor with the fiduciary and is liable as such.”). 
 363. Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734 
S.W.2d 322, 323–26 (Tenn. 1987); see DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, 
§ 10.6 n.4 (explaining that the briber who suborns the fiduciary is generally 
guilty for the tort of inducing breach of contract). See Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 312 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 2006) for a discussion regarding other tort 
approaches, including unfair competition and Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 876 (Am. Law Inst. 1977) for a discussion regarding aiding and abetting. 
 364. See Twp. of Wayne v. Messercola, 789 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D.N.J. 
1992) (finding that the attorney “as an aider and abettor is liable”). 
 365. See id. at 1307 (describing that the attorney agreed to pass along the 
bribe to Messercola relating to a real estate development project).  
 366. See id. (explaining that of the $273,000 received, the attorney kept 
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Although the lawyer was neither the briber nor the rogue agent, 
he was found jointly liable for the full amount of the bribe plus 
the fee that he retained.367 
The employer may recover either proved compensatory 
damages or restitution from Sailer, the briber.368  
B. Compensatory Damages 
In Continental Management, Inc. v. United States,369 the 
Court of Claims held that the Government had a common law 
damages action against a bank whose former president had 
bribed federal employees to obtain mortgage insurance business 
with the Government.370 The bank had the temerity to sue the 
Government to recover mortgage insurance.371 The Government 
counterclaimed to recover the bribes.372 Because the Government 
was unable to prove specific pecuniary damages, we assume that 
the company had performed the contracts satisfactorily and for 
the same consideration the Government would have had to pay 
anyway.373  
The court articulated its reasoning to support the 
Government’s recovery of compensatory damages:  
                                                                                                     
$96,000 for himself). 
 367. See id. at 1311 (“[S]o long as double recovery is not awarded for the 
bribes, the aider and abettor who is a joint tortfeasor with the agent is jointly 
liable to the principal for the agent’s secret profits.” (citation omitted)). 
 368. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1958) (explaining that a person who intentionally causes the violation of a duty 
to a principal is subject to liability either in tort or in restitution); DOBBS, LAW 
OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6 (“From a briber, the victimized employer 
may recover either (1) proven damages or (2) restitution.”). 
 369. 527 F.2d 613 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 
 370. See id. at 621 (“We hold, therefore, that the bribery for which plaintiffs 
are responsible was a wrong against the defendant . . . .”). 
 371. See id. at 614 (describing the suit against the United States for sums 
allegedly due to them under contracts of mortgage insurance issued by the 
Federal Housing Administration).  
 372. See id. (“Only the first counterclaim, in which the Government seeks to 
collect from plaintiffs an amount equal to the sum of bribes paid . . . is before 
the court at this time on the parties’ cross-motions.”). 
 373. See id. at 615 (“Government has shown only that such unlawful 
payments were made and has not proved direct or specific monetary injury.”). 
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It is an old maxim of the law that, where the fact of injury is 
adequately shown, the court should not cavil at the absence of 
specific or detailed proof of the damages. Here, the plaintiffs 
engaged in wrongful conduct that clearly hurt the 
Government. Significant elements of that harm, such as the 
injury to the impartial administration of governmental 
programs, are not susceptible to an accurate monetary gauge. 
We should not deny the Government relief because Sirote 
managed to cause injury not readily traceable or measurable. 
Similarly, the Government’s inability to attach an exact and 
provable dollar figure to the harm it sustained should not 
result in the effective exculpation of the plaintiffs. . . . As 
between the briber and the bribee’s employer, the risks of 
damage determination should fall on the former.374 
But how will the court measure those compensatory 
damages? It continued:  
On this premise the amount of the bribe provides a reasonable 
measure of damage, in the absence of a more precise 
yardstick. That is, after all, the value the plaintiffs placed on 
their corruption of the defendant’s employees; the other side of 
the coin is that the [bribers] hoped and expected to benefit by 
more than the sum of the bribes. It is therefore fair to use that 
total as the measure of an injury which is probable in its 
impact but uncertain in its mathematical calculation. . . . Of 
course, the Government cannot recover the bribes twice—once 
from the briber and again from the corrupted employee. But it 
is entitled to one such recovery.375 
In measuring the Government’s compensatory damages, are 
we willing to accept this much imprecision about its loss or 
injury? The court set recovery at the amount of the bribe, which, 
as the court said, is the value the wrongdoers gave.376 If the 
                                                                                                     
 374. Id. at 619.  
 375. Id. (citations omitted); see also Franklin Med. Assocs. v. Newark Pub. 
Sch., 828 A.2d 966, 974–80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding that the 
victim of a bribe by its agent may recover damages from an aider and abettor of 
a bribery scheme measured by the amount of the bribe without demonstrating 
actual loss); Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 492 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (explaining that the bribed agent’s principal 
recovered the amount of the bribe from the briber, trebled under state RICO 
statute, plus the plaintiff's attorney fee, because the briber deprived the 
principal of the value of the agent’s services and the bribe is the price put on it). 
 376. See Cont’l Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613, 619 (Ct. Cl. 1975) 
(explaining the premise that the amount of bribe provides a reasonable way to 
measure damage).  
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briber was efficiency-minded, it expected to gain more than the 
amount of the bribe. But the defendant’s gain or unjust 
enrichment measures restitution, not compensatory damages. 
Even though Beyer’s injury is not palpably clear, deterrence of 
Sailer and other intentional wrongdoers seems to be a valid 
policy.  
Perhaps the Continental Management court’s view of the 
Government’s remedy as compensatory damages clouded a focus 
on restitution. We turn to the employer’s restitution.  
C. Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Disgorgement 
Sailer obtained something from Beyer: Aggie’s loyalty and an 
economic advantage. Beyer’s restitution from Sailer may take one 
of two forms: rescission-restitution and plain-vanilla restitution.  
Aggie, as Beyer’s agent, had actual authority to buy the 
speakers. Can Beyer, her principal, extricate himself from the 
transaction? Yes, he may rescind his bribe-induced contract with 
Sailer.377 
Suppose Sailer has delivered the speakers to Beyer and 
Beyer has paid Sailer when he discovers that Sailer bribed Aggie. 
Beyer can rescind his contract with Sailer because of Sailer’s 
fraud and receive a refund—restitution of his consideration. But 
in usual rescission-restitution law, Beyer should make 
restitution—return the speakers.378 On first blush, there is a 
                                                                                                     
 377. See Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1952) (discussing a 
principal’s ability to seek damages after rescinding a transaction subject to a 
bribe); Jaclyn, 406 A.2d at 484 n.7 (noting that, in private contracts, a person 
who discovers he has been defrauded has the option to ratify or rescind the 
contract); Black v. MTV Networks Inc. 576 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1991) (allowing MTV to terminate an agreement with Black who “secretly made 
gifts totaling thousands of dollars to MTV’s director of personnel and . . . made 
an interest-free loan of $30,000 to another MTV employee”); Am. Assurance 
Underwriters Grp. v. Metlife Gen. Ins. Agency, 552 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1990) (allowing MetLife to terminate an agreement with AAUG who 
made “secret stock payments to MetLife’s employees”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. e, illus. 9, 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“A principal may avoid a 
contract entered into by the agent with a third party who participated in the 
agent's breach of duty.”). See generally Smith, Fiduciary Relationships, supra 
note 70; Commercial Bribery, supra note 36; Commercial Bribery: The Need for 
Legislation in Minnesota, supra note 36. 
 378. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54(2) 
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striking difference between this result, and a partially executed 
contract where the speakers are delivered but Beyer has not 
paid; Beyer may receive the speakers without paying.  
The court could resolve the difference by refusing restitution 
to Sailer because of his unclean hands—inequitable conduct.379 
Another possible solution is for the court to focus on Beyer’s 
enrichment and utilize discretion in measurement to set an 
amount that Beyer should pay Sailer.  
Suppose that after Sailer delivers the speakers to Beyer, 
Beyer learns about the bribe. Unpaid, Sailer sues Beyer for the 
price. The court should deny Sailer recovery on the ground that 
the “agreement” was tainted by the bribe and illegal in violation 
of public policy. Denial of recovery to a bribe-payer is 
straightforward—at least in government work. All the 
bribe-paying plaintiff’s claims on the contract are forfeited, 
because the bribe is “fraud,” which triggers “nonenforcement” on 
public policy grounds.380 The court, however, may allow Beyer to 
keep the speakers without paying anyone anything for them. 
Does that go too far? 
In Jaclyn, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc.,381 agents of a 
handbag manufacturer frequently bribed employees of a retail 
company.382 Although the retailer found out about the bribes its 
employees were receiving, it continued to purchase merchandise 
from the manufacturer without addressing the bribes.383 
Eventually the retailer defaulted on payments for the 
                                                                                                     
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Rescission requires a mutual restoration and accounting 
in which each party (a) restores property received from the other, to the extent 
such restoration is feasible . . . .”). 
 379. See id. § 63 (“Recovery in restitution to which an innocent claimant 
would be entitled may be limited or denied because of the claimant’s inequitable 
conduct in the transaction that is the source of the asserted liability.”). 
 380. See Supermex, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 29, 40–42 (1996) 
(explaining that only through the remedy of non-enforcement can the 
procurement system free itself of the suspicion of undetected frauds); DOBBS, 
LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6 nn.6–7 (“[I]f the briber has sold goods 
to the victimized employer as a result of illegality, he cannot recover for their 
value; that is, his bribery is a defense to the claim.”). 
 381. 406 A.2d 474 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979). 
 382. Id. at 477 (relating the facts of the case). 
 383. See id. at 478 (explaining that Edison acquired reliable knowledge in 
early 1976 that Jaclyn was making pay-offs to purchasing agents). 
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merchandise.384 The manufacturer sued for the amount that was 
left unpaid for its merchandise, but the retailer offered the 
affirmative defense of commercial bribery under a New Jersey 
statute and counterclaimed for the amount of the bribe.385 The 
court found that the affirmative defense of commercial bribery 
failed because the buyer knew about the bribery scheme and 
continued to let its agents purchase from the manufacturer.386 
However, the court found the manufacturer liable for the amount 
of the bribe, despite the prior knowledge of the buyer.387 
If Sailer sues Beyer for the price and Beyer counterclaims, 
should the court, in addition to refusing to grant Sailer recovery, 
force Sailer to refund Beyer’s earlier payments for the speakers? 
Beyer may argue that, because the transaction was tainted by 
the bribe, it was illegal in violation of public policy. In an 
official-bribery decision in S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York,388 
the New York Court of Appeals went a little farther. The firm 
that had bribed a city employee sued the City for the balance 
“due” on the tainted contract.389 The court, turning the tables, 
held that the City could recover all of the amounts it had paid the 
briber under the bribe-induced contract.390 
Should the court, in addition, force Sailer to refund Beyer’s 
earlier payments for the speakers? Following S.T. Grand above 
into a private bribery, an unpaid Sailer cannot recover the price 
and, perhaps, must return Buyer’s earlier payments. If so, the 
                                                                                                     
 384. See id. at 480–81 (describing a “clearance policy” in which no invoices 
would be paid or normal business resumed until the vendor “told the truth” 
regarding payments to buyers). 
 385. See id. at 483 (“Edison urges this court to hold that one who resorts to 
the acts employed by Jaclyn should be denied the right of recovering the agreed 
price of the goods sold and delivered, notwithstanding that the merchandise 
was retained by Edison and retailed at a profit.”). 
 386. See id. at 484 (indicating that a contract to do an illegal act or one 
made in the violation of a penal statute is void and unenforceable). 
 387. Id. at 491.  
 388. 298 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1973). 
 389. See id. at 106 (stating that the city was being sued for an unpaid 
balance due on the cleaning contract). 
 390. See id. at 108 (explaining that a municipality may recover from the 
vendor all amounts paid under an illegal contract in an effort to deter violation 
of the bidding statutes); see also Woods, supra note 199, at 931–33 (indicating 
that the described scandal effectively created a legal doctrine that is viewed as a 
deterrent to corruption). 
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court has allowed Beyer to keep the speakers without paying 
anyone anything for them. Does this go too far?  
The employer may recover the amount of the bribe from the 
briber as plain restitution.391 Courts have described this recovery 
of restitution as legal restitution of the money had and 
received.392 Two decisions distort or “relax” tracing to find that 
the briber was constructive trustee for the amount it had paid 
plaintiff’s agent.393 
If Sailer was successful, was he enriched? Unjustly? By the 
value of his sales and profits?394 Should a court award Beyer 
restitution from Sailer measured by the amount of the bribe?395 
The amount of Sailor’s gross profit on the speakers? Both? 
Perhaps the larger of the two.396  
The bribing seller’s unjust enrichment does not match the 
amount of the bribe.397 And the seller, having paid the bribe to 
                                                                                                     
 391. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Am. Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 
334, 345 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (defendant was constructive trustee for the amount it 
had paid plaintiff’s agent); Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Schell, 238 Ill. App. 560, 
565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1925) (same); see also In re Browning’s Estate, 30 N.Y.S.2d 
604, 605 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1941) (“The vendor has had and received money which 
belongs to the purchaser to the extent of the bribe, which neither the vendor nor 
the unfaithful agent may in conscience and good morals retain.”). See generally 
Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. 1942); 
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 8.6 n.43. 
 392. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 317 (1910) (indicating that a 
judgment was rendered for “money had and received for its use”). See generally 
Mahesan v. Malay. Hous. Soc’y, [1979] A.C. 374 (PC) (appeal taken from Fed. 
Ct. Malay.)). 
 393. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Am. Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 
334, 346 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (“The Court being of the opinion that it is a situation 
where constructive trust has been established . . . the action is of equitable 
nature.”); Cen. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v Schell, 238 Ill. App. 560, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1925) (“In such case, equity will impress a constructive trust upon the money in 
his hands.”). 
 394. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 395. See PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 8.5 n.10 
(“Whether paid or not there is also authority granting restitution to the 
principal from the defendant who paid or agreed to pay the commission, on the 
theory that the purchase price to the principal was increased by the amount of 
the commission or bribe.”). 
 396. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 1958). 
 397. See James M. Fischer, The Puzzle of the Actual Injury Requirement for 
Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 197, 233–34, 233 n.142 (2008) (demonstrating 
COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 435 
the agent, does not retain the bribe. “There is less doctrinal 
strain,” Professor Palmer observed, “if the [employer’s] recovery 
[from the seller of the amount of the bribe] is regarded as 
damages.”398 Professor Peter Birks also questioned the 
theoretical base of restitution to recover the amount of the bribe 
from the briber: the bribe “is apparently not money received but 
money laid out.”399 Dobbs wrote that “the amount of the bribe 
becomes surrogate for the actual benefits received by the briber 
when those benefits cannot be identified.”400  
Suppose the briber gained more than the amount of the 
bribe. The defendant’s unjust enrichment, if it exceeds the bribed 
agent’s principal’s loss, measures the principal’s recovery. 
Bribery leads to restitution, the briber’s disgorgement of all 
profits.401  
In Williams Electronics Games v. Garrity,402 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the employer-
principal may recover from the briber of his employee.403 Its 
recovery is measured by either its damages or the briber’s profits 
(restitution),404 whichever is larger. The damages formula is the 
bribe plus revenue from the bribe minus the defendant’s 
legitimate costs.405  
In a 2006 New Jersey decision, the defendant-Bank’s 
employee had bribed a public official to obtain the 
                                                                                                     
the difficulty in establishing an action for unjust enrichment against a briber 
because tying the benefit to the briber may be difficult). 
 398. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 2.11 n.22. 
 399. BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 129, at 338. 
 400. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, §10.6. 
 401. See Cty. of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 855 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (“[T]he evidence and law support the trial court and warrant a 
damage award based on disgorgement of the amounts by which [the defendants] 
were unjustly enriched.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 44 illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that “Buyer is entitled to 
recover $5000 from Seller” when Seller bribes Buyer with $5000 because “it 
may be presumed . . . that Seller has derived a benefit of at least $5000 from the 
illegal transaction”). 
 402. 366 F.3d 569, 579 (7th Cir. 2004) 
 403. See id. at 579 (reversing the lower court’s rejection of an employer’s 
claim). 
 404. See id. at 576 (noting the damages remedy and restitution remedy are 
both available to bribery victims). 
 405. See id. (calculating a briber’s total profits). 
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plaintiff-County’s bond business.406 The dispute had been 
through criminal prosecutions and the SEC before the County’s 
civil action against the Bank was tried. Although the Bank had 
already paid the County the amount of the kickbacks, 
$206,809.22, the County sued the Bank to recover its unjust 
enrichment.407 The County sought disgorgement of the Bank’s 
“underwriter’s discount.”408 After a complex submission that 
included several other substantive theories, the jury’s verdict for 
the County was for unjust enrichment-disgorgement.409 
The New Jersey Supreme Court hinged its decision on 
restitution of the defendant’s unjust enrichment, not the 
plaintiff’s loss.410 The Bank’s disgorgement, the court said, is “not 
related to whether the County suffered damages.”411 The court 
turned to measurement of restitution.412 The County could 
recover the Bank’s gross profits, the “total fees received [and 
retained] by the bank.”413 Finally, prejudgment interest ran from 
the date of the improper transaction, not the date of the 
plaintiff’s complaint.414 The remedy was full disgorgement, by 
which means the court intended to deter future bribes.415  
                                                                                                     
 406. See generally Cty. of Essex v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 891 A.2d 600, 
602 (N.J. 2006). 
 407. Id. at 602. 
 408. See id. at 603 (“In the aggregate, the Bank received underwriting fees 
of $2,883,019.15.”). 
 409. See id. (‘The jury returned a verdict in favorof the County for its unjust 
enrichment/disgorgement claim . . . in the amount of $ 600,000.”). 
 410. See id. at 607 (highlighting restitution). 
 411. Id. at 607. 
 412. See id. at 608–09 (assessing the amount the Bank should disgorge to 
the County). 
 413. Id. at 604. 
 414. See id. at 609 ( calculating the interest based on the date of the bribe). 
 415. See id. at 607 (“Strong remedies are necessary to combat unlawful 
conduct involving public officials. Disgorgement in favor of the public entity 
serves as a harsh remedy against those who bribe a public official to secure a 
public contract and provides a deterrent to such unlawful activity.”). See 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 
illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
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IV. Loose Ends 
We have not considered the legal relations between Sailer 
and Aggie and the way the bribe affects third parties.  
After bribing Aggie, suppose Sailer gets cold feet and 
changes his mind about selling speakers to Beyer. Sailer sues 
Aggie for restitution. Even though keeping the speakers leaves 
Aggie unjustly enriched, a court will be likely to cite Sailer’s 
inequitable conduct or unclean hands and refuse to grant him a 
refund.416 Sailer cannot recover the bribe because the court will 
conclude that his misconduct has forfeited his claim to recover 
it.417  
The other side of that coin supposes that Aggie buys Sailer’s 
speakers for Beyer’s inventory. Aggie, the agent who has not 
received the bribe, cannot enforce the briber’s illegal promise to 
pay it.418  
Is there honor among thieves? The cynical “advice” to a 
bribe-giver and his taker is to leave nothing executory, to 
exchange consideration simultaneously.  
Because of Sailer’s bribe to Aggie, Sailer’s competitors did 
not sell their speakers to Beyer. Sailer may be liable to a 
competitor for interference with its prospective advantage.419  
Beyond the seller’s competitors, we have run out of plaintiffs. 
Taxpayer-citizens lack “standing” to sue a crooked official for 
                                                                                                     
 416. See Womack v. Maner, 301 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Ark. 1957) (affirming the 
defendant’s demurrer when the plaintiff sued to recover bribes paid to the 
defendant). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT §§ 32(3) illus. 12, note, 63 (AM. LAW INST. 2011); PALMER, THE LAW 
OF RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 3.6.  
 417. See Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC) 330 [2] (appeal 
taken from NZCA) (UK) (“The provider of a bribe cannot recover it because he 
committed a criminal offence when he paid the bribe.”). 
 418. See Oscanyon v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 267 (1880) (“The court will not 
listen to claims founded upon services rendered in violation of common decency, 
public morality, or the law.”); Wolfe v. Int’l Reinsurance Corp., 73 F.2d 267, 269 
(2d Cir. 1934) (L. Hand, J.) (denying recovery for services rendered when the 
principals involved had conflicting relations); see also PALMER, THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION, supra note 5, § 8.5 (noting that in “nearly all authority,” an agent 
cannot recover a commission where there is illegality on the part of both 
parties). See generally Gray v. Pankey, 100 So. 880, 881 (Ala. 1924); Friedmann, 
supra note 361, at 555–56; Commercial Bribery, supra note 36, at 801. 
 419. See generally DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6. 
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equitable restitution of his bribe.420 In Fuchs v. Bidwill,421 an 
Illinois court held that citizens, residents, and taxpayers lacked 
standing to sue on behalf of the state for equitable restitution of 
corrupt profits allegedly earned by state legislators.422 The State 
Attorney General, the majority held, was the real party in 
interest who could have sued, but individual citizens and 
taxpayers could not.423 
V. Double Recovery, Punitive Damages, and Multiple Damages 
To examine the risk of excess and the need for principles of 
confinement we take up double recovery, punitive damages, and 
multiple damages. 
A. Employer Sues Both the Briber and the Employee 
Suppose Aggie is back. May Beyer recover the amount of the 
bribe twice, from both Aggie—the bribe recipient—and Sailer—
the bribe payer?  
 Beyer may sue both Aggie and Sailer as joint tortfeasors. 
Usually each joint tortfeasor is responsible for all of the plaintiff’s 
damages.424 A plaintiff may be successful against more than one 
defendant under more than one substantive theory, but that 
plaintiff should recover only once—a single satisfaction.425 A 
                                                                                                     
 420. See Fuchs v. Bidwill, 359 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ill. 1976) (stating that the 
public interest would not benefit from allowing private citizens to bring such 
suits). 
 421. 359 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. 1976). 
 422. Id. at 162. 
 423. Id. Justice Schaefer wrote a strong dissent. Id. at 162–65 (Schaefer, J. 
dissenting). But see ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.100 (West 2016) (permitting Alaska 
voters to bring suits to enforce certain statutes concerning public finances); 
Mackey v. McDonald, 504 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Ark. 1974) (permitting a citizen suit 
concerning misappropriation of public money). 
 424. See DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 488. (“When two 
or more tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, each defendant is subject to 
liability for all of the plaintiff’s damages.”). 
 425. See id. § 487 (“If joint and several liability applies, each defendant will 
be liable to the plaintiff . . . subject to the caveat that the plaintiff can only 
receive one satisfaction of the judgement.”). 
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plaintiff may not recover the same element of compensatory 
damages from two defendants.426 The plaintiff is entitled to 
recover only once.427  
Suppose Beyer sues Sailer alone first and recovers the 
amount of the bribe. Considering the reasons to compel a 
bribe-taker to disgorge, should the court limit the plaintiff to that 
one recovery? Two of our courts say “Yes.”428 However, forbidding 
the plaintiff from recovering the amount of the bribe twice, from 
the briber and the bribee, may erode the idea that the breaching 
fiduciary must surrender the fruits of her breach even though the 
principal lost nothing. If Beyer sues Sailer first, recovers, and 
second sues Aggie, then the policy tension is between eschewing 
Beyer’s double recovery of the bribe, on the one hand, and on the 
other, deterring bribes and preventing Aggie’s unjust 
enrichment.  
If Beyer sues Aggie first, Beyer’s recovery from her may 
leave nothing for Sailer to pay later. This may erode the policy of 
deterring bribes.429 We see no possibility for Aggie to pay Beyer 
and then recover indemnity from Sailer.430 We turn to the 
Tennessee court for some enlightenment.  
In litigation involving an employer’s claims against a bribing 
seller and an employee who had received kickbacks, the trial 
judge had entered judgment against the seller for the tort of 
procuring breach of contract.431 The court measured the 
employer’s recovery by the amount of the employee’s salary 
                                                                                                     
 426. See id. § 479 (discussing the basic elements and limitations on 
compensatory damage calculations). 
 427. See United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 572 F. Supp. 2d 73, 77 
(D.D.C. 2008) (declining “to award . . . another judgment against [the 
defendant] in the same amount arising out of the same conduct”); Twp. of 
Wayne v. Messercola, 789 F. Supp. 1305, 1311–12 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding that 
the plaintiff could only recover once for bribery). See generally DOBBS ET AL., THE 
LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 488. 
 428. See Cont’l Mgmt, Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613, 619 (Ct. Cl. 1975) 
(noting that a plaintiff “cannot recover the bribes twice”); Dorsett Carpet Mills, 
Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tenn. 1987). 
 429. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (stating that restitution 
may serve as a deterrent to future acts of bribery). 
 430. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 23 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 431. Dorsett Carpet Mills, 734 S.W.2d at 323. 
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“during the period of his duplicitous conduct.”432 “The trial court 
also rendered a judgment against both [the bribing seller and the 
corrupt employee] for the amount of secret commissions.”433 The 
seller appealed.434 
The Tennessee Supreme Court thought the employee’s salary 
was an appropriate recovery for the employer against the 
employee.435 But the employee’s salary was, the court said, “an 
inappropriate element of damage to charge against the procurer 
of the breach.”436 The secret kickbacks that the seller had paid 
the employee were the employer’s proper recovery against that 
defendant. The court articulated this recovery as compensatory 
damages for the employer’s loss: “[H]ad [the bribing seller] not 
paid this money to [plaintiff’s employee], it may be presumed 
that these funds would have inured to the benefit of [the 
employer] in the form of lower prices or greater commissions.”437 
The court also approved trebled recovery under a Tennessee 
statute that forbids inducing breach of contract.438 
The employer, Birks wrote, “can have either restitution or 
compensation, and whichever he chooses he cannot have it from 
both briber and bribee.”439 However, the court’s focus on tort 
damages might lead it to neglect the other policies of deterrence 
and preventing unjust enrichment. Considering deterrence of 
both payers and receivers of bribes, should the court limit the 
plaintiff to one recovery? If not, how much should the recovery 
be? And how should the court measure it? The Tennessee court 
said that the employer may recover the employee’s salary from 
the employee and the briber’s bribe from it—but not the 
employee’s salary from the briber.440  
                                                                                                     
 432. Id. at 325. 
 433. Id. at 323–24. 
 434. Id. at 324. 
 435. Id. at 325. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. at 326. 
 438. See id. (trebling the damages according to a state statute). 
 439. BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 129, at 338. 
 440. Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734 
S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tenn. 1987). 
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The Tennessee court quoted the Restatement of Torts: “any 
damages in fact paid by the third person will reduce the damages 
actually recoverable” for interference with contract.441 
The question of whether the employer could collect 
judgments from both the seller and the employee without 
receiving duplicated recovery was not, however, raised.442 The 
Tennessee court’s quotation from the Torts Restatement probably 
meant that the court thought that the agent’s re-payment of her 
salary to her principal will reduce the amount the briber owes 
the principal. 
If, on the other hand, the court measures restitution by the 
amount of the defendants’ unjust enrichment, rather than the 
plaintiff’s loss, then it may allow the employer to recover from 
both the briber and the bribee even though, as restitution often 
does, it exceeds compensatory damages.443 Citing decisions that 
go both ways, Dobbs wrote, “[suppose] the employer first recovers 
damages (not restitution) from the briber, then seeks restitution 
from the employee. . . . [T]he second recovery appears desirable to 
force the disloyal employee to disgorge his unjust gain.”444 
Reporters’ notes from two Restatements, Agency Third, and 
Restitution Third, show the policy conflicts and difficulty in 
combining compensatory damages and restitution with recovery 
from both the giver and the receiver of a bribe.445  
The Restatement of Agency begins by saying that the 
employer may not recover the bribe twice, once from employee 
and once from briber.446 But it continues: “If a principal recovers 
damages from a third party as a consequence of an agent’s breach 
                                                                                                     
 441. Id. at 325 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(2) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1979)). 
 442. See id. 
 443. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 44 rep. note b (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[W]here the goal of the remedy is 
accordingly disgorgement rather than compensation, courts have allowed the 
victim to recover the amount of the bribe twice—once from the bribe-giver and 
once from the faithless agent.”). 
 444. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 10.6. 
 445. See infra notes 446–450 and accompanying text (describing the policies 
that inform damages and restitution). 
 446. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 rep. note e (AM. LAW INST. 
2006) (citing Franklin Med. Assocs. v. Newark Pub. Schs., 828 A.2d 966, 976 
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003)). 
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of fiduciary duty, the principal remains entitled to recover from 
the agent any benefit that the agent improperly received from the 
transaction.”447 Beyer, it seems, may recover damages from 
Sailer and the bribe from Aggie.448 
The Restatement of Restitution’s Illustration states: “if a 
double recovery . . . would constitute an inappropriate windfall, 
Buyer’s recovery from Seller may be reduced by the amount of 
any recovery that Buyer obtains from Agent . . . .”449 No double 
recovery from both Sailer and Aggie? The Reporter’s Note on the 
Illustration continues:  
The analytical choice between presumed benefit to the bribe-
giver (justifying a recovery in restitution) and presumed loss 
to the victim (justifying an award of damages in tort) may 
appear somewhat arbitrary. In a commercial bribery case 
where the theory of recovery is indeed unjust enrichment 
rather than injury, and where the goal of the remedy is 
accordingly disgorgement rather than compensation, courts 
have allowed the victim to recover the amount of the bribe 
twice—once from the bribe-giver and once from the faithless 
agent. (The rules of the present Topic consistently allow 
restitution from a conscious wrongdoer in an amount 
exceeding the claimant’s loss.) By contrast, the possibility of a 
double recovery will be properly rejected by a court that sees 
the remedy in a bribery case as an award of damages for 
tort.450  
The principle against unjust enrichment, it seems, overcomes 
duplication and windfall to support Beyer’s recovery of the 
amount of the bribe from both Sailer and Aggie. An observer may 
inquire whether this goes too far. 
B. Punitive Damages 
What about punitive damages for bribery? When we consider 
common law punitive damages, we put the policies of 
compensation and preventing unjust enrichment behind us. The 
                                                                                                     
 447. Id.  
 448. Id. 
 449. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44 
illus. 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 450. Id. § 44 rep. note b. 
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uniform purposes of taking punitive damages from the defendant 
are to punish that defendant and to deter future misconduct, 
hers and others.451 The policies that support awarding the 
punitive damages to the plaintiff are to pay the plaintiff a bounty 
for bringing a wrongdoer to book, to finance the plaintiff’s 
litigation as a surrogate for attorney fee recovery, and to provide 
the plaintiff a peaceful substitute for private vengeance.452 
The defendants’ misconduct may be sufficiently aggravated 
to qualify the plaintiff for punitive damages under the 
jurisdiction’s misconduct threshold, which may be either actual 
malice, implied malice, conscious reckless disregard, or gross 
negligence.453 Punitive damages may be available in addition to 
compensatory damages or restitution.454  
A court may analyze an employee’s breach of fiduciary duty 
to her employer as a tort that qualifies the employer to recover 
punitive damages. Courts have approved punitive damages in 
bribery and breach of fiduciary duty cases.455 The Restitution, 
Employment, and Agency Restatements allow the employer of a 
                                                                                                     
 451. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me. 1985) (“[A] 
substantial majority of jurisdictions today allow common law punitive 
damages . . . for the purpose of deterrence or punishment or both.”); Jaclyn, Inc. 
v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 406 A.2d 474, 492 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) 
(“[Punitive damages] are awarded upon a theory of punishment to the offender 
for aggravated misconduct and to deter such conduct in the future.” (quoting 
Leimgruber v. Claridge Associates, Ltd., 73 N.J. 450, 375 A.2d 652, 654 (1977))). 
 452. See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for 
Everyone?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1, 18 (2009) [hereinafter Rendleman, Common 
Law Punitive Damages] (discussing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 
(2008)); Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive 
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982) (discussing the theories underlying 
punitive damages). 
 453. See generally RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 149–51; Jaclyn, 
Inc., 406 A.2d at 492. 
 454. See Jaclyn, 406 A.2d at 494 (adding punitive damages to compensatory 
damages). 
 455. See Cty. of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 855 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (calculating recovery for bribed public official as the disgorgement of 
all profits plus punitive damages); Hensley v. Tri–QSI Denver Corp., 98 P.3d 
965, 968 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that punitive damages are not “strictly 
limited to the amount of actual damages” awarded); Jaclyn, 406 A.2d at 492–94 
(permitting the recovery of punitive damages from a briber); Banks v. Mario 
Indus. of Va., Inc., 650 S.E.2d 687, 699 (Va. 2007) (outlining the non-bribe 
fiduciary duty and awarding punitive damages because of defendants’ “sinister 
or corrupt motive”). 
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bribed employee to recover compensatory damages and 
restitution, plus punitive damages.456  
The Restatement of Restitution explains the combination of 
restitution with punitive damages:  
Disgorgement of wrongful gain is not a punitive 
remedy. . . . The rationale of punitive or exemplary damages is 
independent of the law of unjust enrichment. The rules that 
govern such damages are part of the tort law of a given 
jurisdiction, . . . . If the defendant’s conduct meets the 
applicable standard for additional liability, there is no 
intrinsic inconsistency in a judgment that reinforces 
disgorgement of wrongful gain with an explicitly punitive 
award.457 
Characterization of bribery as breach of contract militates 
against the plaintiff’s recovery of punitive damages unless the 
defendant also committed an independent tort.458 That tort may 
be fiduciary breach. In Hensley v. Tri–QSI Denver Corp.,459 the 
employer-plaintiff recovered $131,109 for breach of contract, 
which was large, and $5,451 for breach of fiduciary duty, which 
was small.460 But the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
punitive damages under the Colorado statute based only on the 
fiduciary tort.461 
                                                                                                     
 456. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 51 cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (noting that courts “will sometimes 
supplement the defendant's liability in restitution with an award of exemplary 
damages”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
2015) (permitting punitive damages in addition to losses for an employee’s 
breach of tort-based or fiduciary duty); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 8.01 
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“A breach of fiduciary duty may also subject the 
agent to liability for punitive damages when the circumstances satisfy generally 
applicable standards for their imposition.”); see also Smith, Fiduciary 
Relationships, supra note 70, at 622 (“In some jurisdictions, fiduciaries may be 
subject to punitive damages.”). 
 457. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 
cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
 458. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
2015) (permitting punitive damages for breaches of tort based duties or 
fiduciary duties). 
 459. 98 P.3d 965 (Colo. Ct. App 2004). 
 460. See id. at 966 (“The company was awarded $131,109.52 on its breach of 
contract claim and $5,451.39 on its breach of fiduciary duty claim . . . .”). 
 461. See id. at 968 (“No amount of punitive damages could have been 
recovered by the company on its contract breach claim; its breach of fiduciary 
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In Kann v. Kann,462 however, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
held that “there is no universal or omnibus tort for the redress of 
breach of fiduciary duty by any and all fiduciaries.”463 The 
decision affects the litigants’ right to a jury trial and the winner’s 
opportunity to recover punitive damages. Is the Maryland court’s 
view—rejecting an independent tort of fiduciary breach and 
punitive damages—an unnecessary limitation or a salutary 
principle of confinement? 
C. Multiplied Recovery 
The bait of increased recovery leads commercial bribery 
plaintiffs to sue under multiple-damages statutes. In Rhode 
Island, the plaintiff need not search far because the commercial 
bribery statute provides for double damages.464 Examples of 
multiple damages statutes in commercial bribery follow. 
In Kewaunee Science Corporation v. Pegram,465 Kewaunee, 
the former employer, sued both its former purchasing agent and 
several sellers who had bribed its purchasing agent.466 The court 
accepted the plaintiff’s argument “that they should not have to 
prove out of pocket loss due to the transaction.”467 “[C]ommercial 
bribery,” the court said, “harms an employer as a matter of law, 
and the proper measure of damages suffered must include at a 
minimum the amount of the commercial bribes the third party 
paid.”468 Moreover, defendants’ bribery qualified the plaintiff for 
treble “damages” because it is considered misconduct under the 
North Carolina unfair and deceptive trade practices act.469 
                                                                                                     
duty claim was the only tort claim that was presented for resolution.”).  
 462. 690 A.2d 509 (Md. 1997). 
 463. Id. at 521. 
 464. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-7-6 (1956) (establishing double damages in civil 
liability for bribery). 
 465. 503 S.E.2d 417 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). 
 466. Id. at 419 (describing a suit to recover damages resulting from a 
bribery). 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. at 419–20. 
 469. See id. at 420 (trebling damages under North Carolina law). 
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In Franklin Medical Associates v. Newark Public Schools,470 
a New Jersey court trebled the amount of the bribe under the 
state RICO statute and added the plaintiff’s attorney fee.471 The 
Tennessee court trebled the bribed employee’s employer’s 
compensatory damages under a statute that forbids inducing 
breach of contract.472 In Killough, the False Claims Act called for 
statutory penalties plus doubled damages.473 
A trebled RICO damages judgment is also a variation on 
punitive damages.474 “Bribery of a government official . . . can 
serve as a predicate [offense] for a RICO violation.”475 In MDO 
Development Corporation v. Kelly,476 an employer sued an 
embezzling employee under the federal Racketeer Influenced 
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.477 In addition to rejecting the 
defendant’s claim for wages, the court imposed a constructive 
trust on a house that the defendant had purchased with the 
bezzle.478 It trebled the RICO damages judgment.479  
If the court’s policy of restitution is to deter future 
misconduct, can there be too much of a good thing? In MDO 
Development, is the constructive trust, trebling, and denial of 
                                                                                                     
 470. 828 A.2d 966 (Super. Ct. N.J. App. Div. 2003) 
 471. See id. at 974–80 (allowing treble damages and attorney's fees). 
 472. See Dorsett Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Whitt Tile & Marble Distrib. Co., 734 
S.W.2d 322, 323–26 (Tenn. 1987) (allowing trebled damages). 
 473. See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1532 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(affirming doubled damages under the FCA); supra note 189 and accompanying 
text (relating the facts in Killough). Congress amended the statute to treble the 
damages in 1986. See Killough, 848 F.2d at 1532 n.4. This action was filed in 
1985. Id. at 1526. The Government did not seek trebled damages reflecting that 
change. Id. at 1532 n.4. 
 474. See MDO Dev. Corp. v. Kelly, 726 F. Supp. 79, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(declining “to assess punitive damages . . . because the imposition of treble 
damages . . . is already sufficient punishment”). 
 475. Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston, 763 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
 476. 726 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 477. Id. at 81. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1961–63 (2012) (establishing treble 
damages, the bribe, plus a “reasonable” attorney fee § 1964(c), or a constructive 
trust). 
 478. See MDO Dev. Corp., 726 F. Supp. at 85 (imposing a constructive 
trust). 
 479. See id. at 86 (trebling damages). 
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reimbursement480 an excessive recovery, a “windfall” to the 
plaintiff? 
Courts have awarded our commercial bribery plaintiffs 
common law punitive damages and multiple recovery under an 
unfair trade practices act, federal and state RICO statutes, the 
federal False Claims Act, and a statute for interference with 
contract.481 The obscurity and fuzziness this paper has observed 
in choice and measurement of remedies continues in multiple 
damages and their cousin, statutory penalties.  
A court applying a statute does not go through the common 
law reasoning process of examining policy justification, rule, and 
result that leads to creating the law as it applies the statute. The 
court will apply an unambiguous statute as it is written.482 
The policies of multiple recovery are not easy to pin down. 
Legislatures have passed many multiple statutes with policies 
that vary from one state to another. A researcher found every 
policy this paper discusses in courts’ decisions discussing 
multiple, statutory, and “liquidated” recoveries. 
Although multiplying occurs under a statute that caps 
plaintiff’s recovery, courts cite statutory multiple damages to 
justify and explain non-statutory common law punitive 
damages.483 Although a careful researcher did not find a direct 
citation, “enhanced”—that is, trebled—damages for a defendant’s 
“willful” patent infringement are, in everything but name, 
                                                                                                     
 480. See id. at 85–86 (imposing a constructive trust and treble damages, and 
dismissing claims for reimbursement). 
 481. See generally supra notes 466–475 and accompanying text. 
 482. See DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 111, § 3.12 (describing the 
nature of multiple damages statutes and how courts have construed them). 
 483. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 490–515 (2008) 
(discussing statutory multiple damages when determining the question of 
punitive damages in the maritime law context); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 
1353, 1355–56 (Me. 1985) (looking to statutory multiple damages when 
examining Maine punitive damages law). 
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punitive damages.484 Other major federal multiple statutes are 
RICO, false claims, and antitrust.485  
Support can be found for punitive policies.486 One court held 
that “liquidated” or statutory damages are punitive, but that 
recovery of interest is compensatory, so that recovery of both is 
not duplicative.487 Other support is on the fence between punitive 
and “remedial” damages.488 Some decisions identify “remedial” 
damages.489 By “remedial” courts seem to mean favoring the 
private litigant instead of the public-law functions of punishment 
and deterrence.490 The Supreme Court said that Congress may 
have enacted multiple damage statutes to arm private plaintiffs 
as private attorneys general to vindicate the statute’s policy 
because of scarce prosecutorial resources.491 Closing the circle, a 
court said that human rights act treble damages are 
compensatory.492 In Killough, the Court of Appeals said that 
                                                                                                     
 484. See Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Electronics, 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935–36 (2016) 
(noting that willful and “egregious”” misconduct may permit the court to award 
enhanced damages); Christopher Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and 
Enhanced Damages After In Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
417, 422 (2012) (noting the potential impact of enhanced damages in patent 
remedies).  
 485. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963–64 (2012) (establishing civil and criminal 
penalties for RICO violations); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012) (establishing liability 
and penalties for FCA violations); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (establishing antitrust 
penalties). 
 486. See Genty v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 910 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(discussing Congress’s intent behind RICO); Bryan T. Camp, Dual Construction 
of RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 61, 80–81 
(1994) (discussing punitive and remedial purposes underlying RICO penalties). 
 487. See Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 755 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding 
prejudgment interest and liquidated damages to be not duplicative). 
 488. See E. Thomas Sullivan, Antitrust Regulation of Land Use: 
Federalism’s Triumph over Competition, The Last Fifty Years, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 473, 506 n.178 (2000) (citing lower court cases that found treble damages 
to be remedial). 
 489. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240–
41 (1987) (discussing RICO’s remedial purposes). 
 490. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 
151 (1987) (noting the pressure on “private attorneys general”). 
 491. See id. (discussing the aims of two multiple damages statutes). 
 492. See Convent of the Visitation Sch. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 707 F. Supp. 412, 
416 (D. Minn. 1989) (noting statutory language to this effect). 
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purpose of doubling and forfeiture in the False Claims Act was to 
reimburse the cost of investigation and litigation.493  
Finally, in Rex Trailer v. United States,494 the Supreme 
Court dealt with a statutory penalty plus doubling for 
defendant’s violation of the Surplus Property Act after World 
War II.495 The Court used “restitution” in a quotation to describe 
compensatory damages; it equated multiple damages with 
liquidated damages; and it hinted in a footnote that unjust 
enrichment was also involved.496  
Multiple damages for commercial bribery are based on 
several policies: to punish, to deter, to compensate for the 
plaintiff’s hard-to-prove loss, to encourage private litigation, and 
to unwind the defendant’s unjust enrichment.497 But an observer 
may inquire whether multiple damages are, on balance, a wise 
and balanced solution. 
VI. Principled Choice and Measurement Decisions 
After surveying the possible smorgasbord of defendants and 
monetary remedies, we will attempt some legal theory and 
jurisprudential generalizations about choice and measurement of 
remedies.498 The parties to a bribe are not trying to help the 
future plaintiff when they engage in an intentional, bad-faith 
wrong. Their misconduct may, but may not, cause the agent’s 
principal to lose. Commercial bribery, in addition to being a 
crime, leads to monetary civil remedies, wage forfeiture, 
                                                                                                     
 493. See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1534 (1988) (“Forfeitures 
and double damages recompense the government for costs of the investigation 
and litigation as well as the actual monetary damage incurred because of the 
defendant's fraud.”). But see Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 800 (2000) (describing the trebled damages imposed after 
the 1986 FCA amendments as “essentially punitive in nature”). 
 494. 350 U.S. 148 (1956). 
 495. Id.  
 496. See id. at 151–53 (examining the Surplus Property Act’s remedies 
provisions). 
 497. See supra notes 465–496 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
different policy justifications for imposing multiple damages). 
 498. See infra notes 500–549 and accompanying text (discussing various 
legal theories of distributive justice and how to measure remedies). 
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damages-restitution, often measured by the bribe, both legal and 
equitable restitution, and multiple and punitive damages.499  
Legal theory examines the bipolar question of “yes” or “no,” 
usually not the more nuanced remedies questions of choice and 
measurement. Our analysis modifies a framework based on 
variations of Professor Cooter’s three-part economic and policy 
based analysis of categories of substantive standards leading to 
remedies. Cooter names these categories: first, a liability right, 
more accurately and hereafter a right to compensatory damages; 
second, a right to disgorgement or restitution; and, third, 
punitive damages, called disgorgement-plus.500 
First, if a defendant has breached a compensatory damages 
rule, then—surprise!—the court will award that plaintiff 
compensatory damages. Compensating the plaintiff’s loss, Cooter 
posits, means that the court sets the plaintiff’s recovery at a level 
to allow the defendant’s activity to continue but also to deter 
similar potentially harmful activity because it forces the 
defendant to internalize its activity’s full cost.501  
The compensatory damages rule covers defendant’s 
negligence and breach of contract. Commercial bribery, as 
discussed above, breaches the employment contract, but it is also 
an independent tort-type of intentional misconduct.502 An 
example of compensatory damages in commercial bribery is the 
plaintiff’s recovery of lost profits. In legal theory, corrective 
justice unwinds an improper transaction; it requires the 
wrongdoer to compensate the victim. Corrective justice applies to 
giving-back restitution, for example, when the bank has 
mistakenly deposited money in the defendant’s account. By one 
way of looking at it, an owner’s property is involved and the bank 
never stopped owning the money. Corrective justice focuses on 
                                                                                                     
 499. See supra notes 48–53Error! Bookmark not defined. and 
accompanying text (explaining the various consequences, both civil and 
criminal, of commercial bribery). 
 500. See Robert Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic 
Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 76–77 (1997) (examining the purpose 
and effects of legal punishments). 
 501. See id. at 77 (discussing incentives and deterrents in compensatory and 
prohibitive damages structures). 
 502. See supra notes 67–87 and accompanying text (discussing the basis of 
liability for commercial bribery). 
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the wrongdoer’s repair of remedial duties. Helpful for 
compensatory damages and giving-back restitution,503 corrective 
justice does not explain nominal damages, punitive damages, or 
giving-up restitution.  
Corrective justice explains some, but not all, remedies for 
commercial bribery. Measuring the principal’s compensatory 
damages by the amount of the bribe is inaccurate and 
incongruous with the idea that a plaintiff must prove damages. 
In addition, a commercial bribery plaintiff can seek restitution.  
Second, in Cooter’s analysis, suppose the defendant breached 
a standard with what he calls a “disgorgement” or restitution 
measure.504 The court will measure the plaintiff’s recovery to 
force the defendant to disgorge all of her gains to the victim.505 
The defendant’s forced payment to the plaintiff will arguably 
deter repetition by making the defendant, and other potential 
defendants, reconsider whether they should begin or continue 
any misconduct.  
The reason giving-back restitution does not work in 
commercial bribery is that nothing exists for the defendant to 
“return” to the plaintiff. The bribe flowed from the briber to the 
bribee without ever resting with the plaintiff. Giving-up 
restitution enters here because the recipient benefitted from the 
bribe unjustly. The court can measure the bribed agent’s 
restitution by the amount of the bribe. It can name the 
restitution as money had and received, accounting-disgorgement, 
or constructive trust. Measuring what the briber pays to the 
principal by the amount of the bribe is more difficult to explain.  
Often in restitution, the defendant should give up an asset 
that the plaintiff has not lost. The most difficult example is the 
bribee’s return on investment when the bribe is invested and 
makes a profit.506 The Supreme Court required a bribe recipient 
                                                                                                     
 503. See Katy Barnett, Distributive Justice and Proprietary Remedies Over 
Bribes, 35 LEGAL STUD. 302, 306 (2015) (discussing corrective justice). 
 504. See Cooter, supra note 500, at 76–77 (describing disgorgement as part 
of a three-category remedies survey). 
 505. See id. (“‘Perfect disgorgement’ is a sum of money that leaves the 
injurer indifferent between the injury with liability for damages or no injury.”). 
 506. See Harding, supra note 285, at 33–34 (discussing the contested 
question of whether a fiduciary holds such a non-diverted gain on constructive 
trust for the plaintiff, when that constructive trust is formed, and whether she 
must “account for her gain by way of a personal remedy”). 
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to account for everything taken, exceeding the amount traced and 
the amount of the plaintiff’s damages.507 Professor Harding 
justified “the fullest possible disgorgement” for bribery: “the 
value of trusting interpersonal relationships and guaranteeing 
the trustworthiness of trustees and fiduciaries and moral 
injunctions against using other people.”508 Surrendering the 
bribe, in addition to profits generated from the bribe, to the 
plaintiff makes the defendant reconsider repeating the 
misconduct, finances the plaintiff’s litigation, and creates an 
incentive for the plaintiff to enforce the norm; it prevents and it 
redresses. 
The chief distinction between the compensatory damages 
and restitution is that compensatory damages respond to the 
plaintiff’s loss, while restitution responds to the defendant’s gain. 
Although both are said to deter, if disgorgement-restitution 
exceeds compensatory damages, restitution will be the greater 
deterrent.  
Civil-recourse theory posits that when someone commits a 
legal wrong, the victim is entitled to a remedy to hold the 
wrongdoer to account to satisfaction, vindication, and redress.509 
Oriented to explaining liability more than the remedy and its 
measurement, civil-recourse theory helps explain compensatory 
damages but also nominal and punitive damages, restitution, and 
disgorgement of unjust gains. 
Distributive justice is another approach to giving-up 
restitution disgorgement.510 The principal never owned a bribe, 
so a property-based approach falls short. There is no transaction 
to reverse, nothing to return. The defendant’s disgorgement of 
the bribe is distributive justice. 
Professor Katy Barnett maintains that distributive justice 
principles justify a court in imposing a constructive trust for a 
                                                                                                     
 507. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 317 (1910) (summarizing the 
costs owed by the bribe recipient, which included “whatever gains, profits or 
gratuities” he received). 
 508. Harding, supra note 285, at 34. 
  509. See John C.P. Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CAL. L. REV. 467, 503 
(2015) (“Tort law is largely about victims' rights: the right of potential victims 
not to be injured, and the right of actual victims to respond to their injury.”). 
 510. See generally Harding, supra note 285, at 24–26, 30, 31–33, 34. 
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bribe.511 Distributive justice requires the court to make a moral 
judgment about which party deserves the property. To choose 
between the three remedies of equitable lien, accounting, and 
constructive trust, she subscribes to a discretionary remedial 
constructive trust based on the court’s analysis of dessert, needs, 
and equality.512 A court, she maintains, should award a 
commercial-bribery plaintiff a constructive trust because that 
“claimant deserves the property more than any other person who 
may have a claim to it.”513 She regards the need to find a 
plaintiff’s pre-existing property interest as a legal fiction that 
prevents the court from admitting that it is redistributing the 
defendant’s profit to the plaintiff.514 
Barnett writes that tracing the bribe to third parties 
prevents a defendant from “laundering” the money and deters 
future bribes.515 Decisions about deterrence should be contextual, 
depending on the facts of each case. For this purpose, a 
discretionary remedial constructive trust is superior to a 
proprietary constructive trust.516 Barnett confirms the position I 
took above on the remedial constructive trust. 
Applying Barnett’s analysis, a constructive trust plaintiff 
should outrank a third party in the trust res unless the third 
party is a bona fide purchaser.517 A constructive trust also 
captures the trust res’s gain in value for the plaintiff. Because 
the defendant’s creditors are not wrongdoers, however, Barnett 
favors a personal judgment for an accounting instead of a 
constructive trust when the defendant is insolvent.518  
                                                                                                     
 511. See Barnett, supra note 503, at 306 (“The claimant deserves the 
property more than any other person who may have a claim to it.”); see also 
Harding, supra note 285, at 35 (explaining that responses to breaches of duties 
by distributive justice in cases of non-diverted gains often hinges on the 
argument that the fiduciary’s breach may be grounds for disgorgement via 
“allocation tout court” by division according to a “norm of distributive justice”). 
 512. Id. at 306–07. 
 513. Id. at 306. 
 514. Id. at 315–16. 
 515. Id. at 320 n.115. For further discussion of deterrence, see Harding, 
supra note 285, at 35. 
 516. Barnett, supra note 503, at 320. 
 517. Id. at 303–04. 
 518. See generally id. at 312–13 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 61 (AM. LAW INST. 2011)). 
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Cooter’s third category, punitive damages, is the plaintiff’s 
recovery that exceeds compensatory damages and 
restitution-disgorgement.519 The court responds to the 
defendant’s aggravated misconduct by imposing punitive 
damages on the defendant to punish and deter a potential 
defendant’s intentional wrongdoing. With punishment, criminal 
justice policy re-enters. In comparing restitution with punitive 
damages, a court will mete out and measure both restitution and 
punitive damages to deter the defendant’s profitable misconduct 
by taking the defendant’s benefit or profit. The policy bases are 
not identical. The court awards a plaintiff restitution to deter and 
to prevent or reverse the defendant’s unjust enrichment. 
Nevertheless, disgorgement-restitution has a punitive quality.520  
The court imposes punitive damages on a defendant to 
punish and to deter that defendant and others from misconduct. 
The court has separate reasons to give punitive damages to the 
plaintiff; these include to pay the plaintiff a bounty for bagging a 
miscreant, to finance the plaintiff’s expensive litigation, to 
obviate private revenge, and to award the plaintiff concealed 
compensation, perhaps for losses under- or un-compensated by 
compensatory damages measures.521 
Punitive damages may be appropriate for commercial 
bribery. Defendants intentionally breached a specific duty to act 
in the best interest of the plaintiff—an identified person. 
Defendants’ concealed intentional misconduct, based on greed for 
illicit profit, comprises commercial bribery. Also, commercial 
bribery is usually a crime—a public wrong. The retributive 
policies associated with criminal punishment appropriately lead 
to punishment beyond compensating the victim. Three 
restatements with scholarly approbation support punitive 
damages with restitution in appropriate cases of defendants’ 
aggravated wrongdoing.522 
                                                                                                     
 519. See Cooter, supra note 500, at 77 (explaining that punitive damages 
are both “extra-compensatory” and “extra-disgorging”). 
 520. See Mark Gergen, What Renders Enrichment Unjust, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1927, 1934, 1964 n.181 (2001) (noting that, in utilitarian terms, disgorgement-
restitution serves a deterrent purpose because of its punitive nature). 
 521. See generally Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages, supra note 
452, at 7. 
 522. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(b) (AM. 
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Along the moral continuum, labeling a defendant’s 
misconduct as criminal is more serious than labeling it as a tort 
accompanied by punitive damages. For one thing, the civil 
procedure leading to punitive damages is less demanding than 
criminal procedure; for another, the criminal label’s consequences 
and stigma are more opprobrious.523 
Once we examine the categories above and seek to align the 
rules with policy justifications, we notice that observers’ views of 
the appropriate function of civil remedies diverge.524  
Deterrence is cited as a policy justification for every remedy 
we have examined; compensatory damages, disgorgement-
restitution, and punitive damages. “When you want to stop the 
others from doing something they would otherwise do, that is 
deterrence.”525 A short examination of deterrence will illuminate 
commercial bribery policies. 
Bribery may be deterred by legal and remedial rules because, 
based on the defendants’ greed, bribery is intentional, calculated 
in advance, and involves two or more people. Commercial bribery 
is a crime in most states in addition to a civil cause of action. 
Like most property crimes, commercial bribery is planned.  
The basic goals of torts are compensation, deterrence, and 
morality-corrective justice.526 Under Judge Learned Hand’s 
formulation in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,527 the 
                                                                                                     
LAW INST. 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 51 cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (citing Ward v. Taggert, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal. 
1959)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 8.01 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
NICHOLAS MCBRIDE, RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ESSAYS 251, 
259, 265 (Charles Mitchell & William Swadling eds., 2013). See also Smith, 
Fiduciary Relationships, supra note 70, at 622 ((“[T]aking away the profit that a 
person makes from a transaction is not a logical way to deter them from making 
such profitable transactions. A properly designed deterrent has to go beyond 
that.”). 
 523. See Goldberg, supra note 509, at 501 (discussing wrongdoing in the 
criminal and tort context). 
 524. For an in-depth consideration of this divergence, see Jeff Berryman, 
Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Behavioural Modification, Cy-Pres Distributions 
and Class Actions, 53 SUP. CRT. L.R. 133, 134–39 (2011). 
 525. AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A GAME 
THEORIST’S GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN BUSINESS AND LIFE 183 (2008). 
 526. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 100, § 10. 
 527. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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measure of compensatory damages that a plaintiff receives for 
the defendant’s negligent tort sets the amount that the defendant 
and other potential defendants in the future should spend on 
prevention.528 A defendant is negligent when the damages, the 
magnitude of the risk calculated by considering both how 
probable and how severe the plaintiff’s injury is, exceeds the cost 
or burden of risk prevention.529  
The goal of disgorgement-restitution is to prevent or reverse 
defendant’s unjust enrichment. This measure deters by taking 
the defendant’s benefit and may lead to plaintiff’s recovery that 
exceeds compensation. 
Punitive damages for a defendant’s aggravated tort add 
punishment and deterrence. They are a deadweight loss to the 
defendant in addition to and unrelated to the plaintiff’s 
compensatory damages.  
Deterrence looks forward to future incentives to behave or 
misbehave. It stems from a rational-actor view based on law and 
economics.530 A potential wrongdoer will calculate depending on 
the probability of detection and the penalties or costs including 
shame and reputation.531 If enforcement mechanisms 
demonstrate a credible ability to impose costs, deterrence 
calculations convince its target that prospective costs outweigh 
prospective benefits.  
Professor Rose-Ackerman discusses using the criminal law to 
deter bribery.532 Bearing in mind that commercial bribery is also 
a crime, her analysis begins, “An offence should be treated as a 
civil matter if society wishes to trade off the benefits to the 
perpetrator against the costs.”533 A potential participant in 
bribery should face a penalty that equals or exceeds her gains 
calculated in consideration of the probability of her being found 
                                                                                                     
 528. See id. at 173 (discussing a formulaic approach to the duty of care). 
 529. Id. 
 530. See Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 
181–203 (2011–2012) (arguing that tort liability serves as a clear warning sign 
to rational actors in the marketplace). 
 531. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 20, at 222. 
 532. See id. at 223 (“To deter bribery, at least one side of the corrupt 
transaction must face penalties that reflect its own gains.”). 
 533. Id. at 221 n.4. 
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out.534 The penalty should exceed the benefit. When the chance of 
detection is less than 100%, “to properly deter, the penalty should 
be a multiple of the gain to the firm.”535 Criminal “penalties for 
bribers should not be tied to those costs unless they are a good 
proxy for the briber’s benefits.”536 The briber’s gains are a better 
proxy than the bribe.537 As Professor Rose-Ackerman explains: 
Once one takes the costs of prevention into account, the level 
of deterrence expenditures should be set where the net 
benefits are maximized, that is where marginal benefits equal 
the marginal costs. A higher level of deterrence would not be 
worth the extra costs, a lower level would sacrifice the net 
benefits of increased enforcement.538  
Some undetected bribery will occur, but the court’s response 
sanction should be stiff.  
Yet deterrence calculations may often be ineffectual. Its 
effects are difficult to locate and pin down. Because deterrence of 
this defendant and other potential defendants casts its effect into 
the future, it is imprecise to measure. Deterrence succeeds when 
nothing happens; this leads to difficult calculations about cause 
and effect.539 What caused nothing to happen? What does 
inaction mean? Is it lack of intent or intent that lapsed? Is it 
perhaps a fear of a sanction or something unrelated to 
deterrence’s threat? Honesty, training? 
Fiduciary law, Professor Sherwin maintains, is based on a 
strong deterrence policy.540 “Breach of fiduciary duty,” Professor 
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Friedmann wrote, “constitutes perhaps the most conspicuous 
area of application of deterrent principles to restitution.”541 
 On the other hand, Professor Lionel Smith eschews 
deterrence as a justification or policy in fiduciary law.542 
Fiduciary law, Smith writes, has no deterrent function; not 
instrumental, fiduciary law is based in the normative 
structure.543 Business entities, market participants, and 
insurance carriers that are conscious of potential liability 
implement preventive measures to prevent or deter casualties. 
Careful businesses check references, and train and monitor 
employees.544 
Professor Gary Schwartz’s thorough study found only 
moderate deterrence in torts, mostly negligence, treated sector by 
sector.545 The economic model that compensatory damages deter 
has mixed success in actually altering potential defendants’ 
conduct. Fine tuning, Schwartz concluded, will not reach perfect 
deterrence.546 Professors Cardi, Penfield, and Yoon used 
experimental surveys of law students to yield a negative answer 
to their title’s question “Does Tort Law Deter?”547 Looking at the 
other end of the remedial spectrum, Professor Anthony Sebok 
rejected the argument that deterrence justifies punitive damages. 
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Retribution—punishment—is, in Sebok’s view, the better 
justification.548 
The rational actor view of deterrence, which dominated 
criminal policy making and sentencing decisions, has faltered 
recently. Professor Ulen defected from the economic analysis idea 
that potential criminals compare benefits with consequences 
discounted by the probability of avoiding detection.549 The 
rational actor model may have an uncertain impact on bribe 
payers and recipients. Rational choice theory may not predict the 
behavior of those most in need of deterrence. Instead, commercial 
bribery occurs because of over-confident people who know 
commercial bribery is wrong but are not risk-aversive.550 
What the New York court said in Walker v. Sheldon551 about 
punitive damages to deter fraud is, with bracketed interpolation, 
instructive about courts’ views of deterrence of commercial 
bribery:  
Exemplary damages are more likely to serve their desired 
purpose of deterring similar conduct in a fraud [bribery] case, 
such as that before us, than in any other area of tort. One who 
acts out of anger or hate, for instance, in committing assault 
or libel, is not likely to be deterred by the fear of punitive 
damages. On the other hand, those who deliberately and coolly 
engage in a far-flung fraudulent [bribery] scheme, 
systematically conducted for profit, are very much more likely 
to pause and consider the consequences if they have to pay 
more than the actual loss suffered by an individual plaintiff.552 
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A student writer concluded that the employer’s civil 
remedies are inadequate; the “basically ineffectual” remedies’ 
“negligible deterrent effect” show the need for stern criminal 
measures.553 Examining the court’s choice of remedies for 
commercial bribery, Barnett maintained that a potential 
constructive trust instead of a money judgment is a refinement 
that will not deter the parties to a bribe.554 
Working with policies of compensation, reversing unjust 
enrichment, deterrence, and punishment is difficult because of 
the blurred and subjective borders between them. In State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,555 the Supreme 
Court quoted a Comment in the Restatement of Torts for the idea 
that compensatory damages for a plaintiff’s emotional distress 
already contain a punitive element: “In many cases in which 
compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress, 
such as humiliation or indignation aroused by the defendant’s 
act, there is no clear line of demarcation between punishment 
and compensation and a verdict for a specified amount frequently 
includes elements of both.”556 Nevertheless, the same Court 
explained in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group557 that 
“compensatory damages and punitive damages . . . serve distinct 
purposes”;558 while “[t]he former are intended to redress the 
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct, . . . [t]he latter, which have been 
described as ‘quasi-criminal,’ operate as ‘private fines’ intended 
to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.”559 
Indeed, as the Court put it more bluntly in State Farm, 
“[punitive] awards serve the same purposes as criminal 
penalties.”560 
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Although the policies of compensatory damages, restitution 
and punitive damages differ, courts seldom distinguish the 
remedies based on their policies. When they do distinguish, it 
may be for a reason divorced from awarding a remedy. An 
example of the latter occurred in Texas. Dealing with a 
constructive-trust judgment debtor’s supersedeas bond on appeal, 
the court distinguished compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, and disgorgement-restitution as well as costs, interest, 
and attorney fee to apply a statute that required a bond only for 
compensatory damages.561 
Restitution and compensation overlap. Restitution of the 
give-it-back variety equals compensatory damages. In addition, 
the remedies and policies overlap. In 2015, a federal judge wrote 
that trademark infringement for an accounting is based on 
policies of deterrence, unjust enrichment, and compensation, the 
latter because defendant’s profits, in addition to unjust 
enrichment, may be a “proxy” “rough measure” that can measure 
plaintiff’s damages.562 The disgorgement restitution we are 
examining exceeds the plaintiff’s compensatory damages, which 
may not exist at all. If the line between compensatory damages 
and punitive damages is fuzzy, the line between restitution and 
penalty is unfortunately blurred.563 “I concede,” Professor 
Partlett wrote, “that it [is] not always easy to distinguish 
retribution from deterrence, particularly when courts use loaded 
retributive rhetoric. This is certainly the case with punitive 
damages.”564 
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The legal-realist view I have taken in this Article is 
process-oriented and eclectic; it considers compensation, 
deterrence, punishment-retribution, corrective justice, normative 
articulation, and civil recourse theory as overlapping and, as 
such, relatively compatible.565 A court deciding between two 
remedies needs a sense of proportion and context to avoid excess 
and overlapping remedies. When I sensed that the law tended to 
excess above, I posed a question to focus on the potential. A court 
setting punitive damages should take counsel from the multiple 
statutes that doubling, at most trebling, suffices. 
VII. Conclusion 
I am not sure that the preceding analysis, featuring rule and 
policy complexity, overlapping remedies, grey areas, and 
unanswered questions would dispel my Remedies students’ fog 
that launched it. The simple commercial bribery that 
transmogrified into an advanced, but mini, course in Remedies 
may leave them still muddled; but, I aspire to have stimulated 
analysis on a more advanced plane. Aligning policy with rule, 
remedy, and result turns out to be an inconclusive quest even for 
their professor. Tort, contract, employment, fiduciary, and agency 
policies are not always congruent, leading from contort to choices. 
The boundaries between the remedies overlap and leave 
contested grey territory open to adversary argument and judicial 
characterization. Moreover, the categories are founded on 
multiple policy justifications and feature primary, secondary, and 
overlapping justifications. Observers question basic premises. 
The overarching policy of deterrence leads to questions of 
whether and how accurately legal rules deter and, if so, how 
much to deter. What take-home points can we posit?  
My advice for Beyer or another bribery victim comes from 
the 1209 “crusade” against the heretic Albigensians in southern 
France. When “the papal legate was asked should Catholics be 
spared, he answered, ‘Kill them all, for God knows His own.’”566 
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My advice to a commercial bribery plaintiff is to take the legate’s 
advice. Sue both the bribe giver and the recipient. Include other 
wrongdoers or recipients because a constructive trust allows the 
plaintiff to trace the bribe to third persons. Allege both breach of 
contract and torts, breach of fiduciary duty and interference with 
contract. If a multiple-damages statute may cover the case, add 
another count. Demand compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, legal restitution money, had and received, equitable 
restitution, a constructive trust and an accounting, along with 
multiplied recovery and attorney’s fees. The court “knows His 
own.”567  
Taking a broader perspective than a lawyer maximizing a 
client’s interest, the court should identify, locate, and measure 
the parties’ just desserts. A court should strive to match a legal 
rule or remedy with its policy justifications.568 Our comments 
above should dispel some of the substantive and remedial cloud 
that shrouds commercial bribery. Precedent decisions will reduce 
uncertainty.569 
My tentative recommendation on Beyer’s recovery from 
Aggie and Sailer follows for the entertainment and edification of 
readers who have studied their peculations. Aggie turns the 
$8,000 bribe over to Sailer as restitution for breach of her 
fiduciary duty. Sailer’s obligation to Beyer for his tort of 
interference with contract is in the $5,000 to $15,000 damages 
range. Do the defendants get off too lightly? The stripped-down 
hypothetical lacks sufficient facts and context to evaluate 
whether the court might impose punitive damages on these 
intentional wrongdoers. 
The human factor is crucial in decision making. As Professor 
Tim Dare wrote:  
No matter how carefully we construct our systems of rules and 
principles, cases inevitably arise in which we are unsure 
which rule applies, in which we want to make an exception to 
an applicable rule, or in which we think an apparently 
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inapplicable rule should after all be applied in a particular 
case. In such cases, judgment or practical wisdom is required 
if we are to obtain the benefit of general rules and principles 
without paying the considerable costs threatened by their 
mindless application.570  
Bringing the money remedies for commercial bribery forward 
exposes the risk of excess. Professor Sherwin contrasts fiduciary 
to contract law. The fiduciary remedies, she shows, are stricter 
than the contract remedies.571 In particular, courts dealing with a 
breaching fiduciary impose maximum liability with no equity 
default or safety valve and but one exception, apportionment.572 
Potential excess lurks in speculative compensatory damages, 
restitution unchecked by policy, duplicated recovery, punitive 
damages, and multiplied recovery. The court needs to overcome 
justified disapprobation for the defendants’ misconduct and, like 
Goldilocks, pick enough but not too much porridge from the 
remedial smorgasbord. The court’s equitable discretion and 
principles of confinement should stem from careful fact-finding, 
examination of the commercial and individual contexts, a sense 
of proportion, and clear identification of the policies. 
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